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Are the attitudes and cognitive style of top management related to an entity’s financial 
reporting quality?  The answer is important because the control environment, which includes 
management’s philosophy and operating style under COSO, is presumed to be the foundation of 
internal control necessary for effective transaction level processing and for management’s 
judgments implementing financial reporting and disclosure requirements.  Yet empirical tests of 
the presumption are impaired by the inability to measure management’s attributes.  In this study, 
I extract linguistic markers of top management’s attitudes and cognitive style from their response 
to financial reporting queries from the Securities and Exchange Commission staff and I relate the 
markers to concurrent material misstatements in the financial statements under scrutiny.  To 
minimize the influence of outside professional advisors, I use responses to the initial mandated 
comment letters for small business issuers whose statements contained material misstatements 
and an industry- and size-matched sample of firms without misstatements.  Using factor analysis, 
I find a factor composed of lower analytical thinking and higher clout significantly improves the 
explanatory power of a logistic regression of concurrent material misstatement and reduce the 
Type 1 and Type 2 classification error rates by 5% and 25%, respectively.  Results are consistent 
with management’s attitudes and cognitive style being associated with financial reporting 
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quality, either directly through management’s accounting judgments or indirectly through 
internal controls. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
An entity’s financial reporting system serves as the basis for the preparation of the annual 
financial report, including recording transactions, ensuring accurate timely recognition, and 
adhering to and properly interpreting Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).  
Within GAAP and regulatory oversight, management has much discretion and flexibility when 
interpreting and applying GAAP, but little is known about the extent to which managements’ 
own attitudes and cognitive thinking that underlie decision processes and oversight of the 
financial reporting system affects the quality of financial reporting to outsiders, including 
investors. 
In 1992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 
(COSO), established what has become the authoritative guidance for a system of internal 
controls entitled Internal Control – Integrated Framework.  The framework proposed that an 
internal control system is composed of five interrelated components: Control Environment; Risk 
Assessment; Control Activities; Information and Communication; and Monitoring, with the 
control environment the foundation for the other four components.  When describing the role of 
employees in an internal control system, COSO emphasizes the role of top management, noting 
“[m]ore than any other individual, the chief executive officer sets the ‘tone at the top’ that affects 
integrity and ethics and other factors of a positive control environment” (COSO 1992).  
Consequently, the control environment is a pervasive corporate component driven by individual 
choices, preferences, and discretion of top management, including CEOs and CFOs. 
Prior researchers have tested the quality of control activities, corporate governance, and 
boards of directors, but research has not yet directly measured tone at the top or the role of 
management attitudes and cognitive style on financial reporting quality.  In this study, I measure 
2 
 
the attitudes and cognitive style of top management to determine whether these elements of the 
control environment are related to an entity’s financial reporting quality. 
My study is important because the broadest element of an internal control system - the 
overarching control environment - which includes management’s philosophy and operating style 
under COSO, is presumed to be the foundation of internal control, yet has had little empirical 
research due to measurement difficulties.  A strong control environment is necessary for 
effective transaction level processing and for management’s judgments and estimates 
implementing financial reporting and disclosure requirements.  The control environment sets the 
tone of an organization, influencing the control consciousness of its people (COSO 1992).  All 
other components of the framework take place in the control environment and are inherently 
impacted by the pervasive nature of the environment. 
Some of the most egregious fraudulent financial misreporting can be traced back to a 
weak control environment, highlighted by a weak “tone at the top” where management allowed, 
encouraged, or promoted a culture of blatant disregard for sound corporate policies and overrode 
or disregarded existing internal controls driven by incentives to achieve earnings targets.  In 
2001, it came to light that Enron hid billions of dollars in debt through complicated and illegal 
accounting transactions, including special purpose vehicles that artificially enhanced its “bottom 
line” or net income.  Subsequent articles examining the corporate culture at Enron “…describe 
and discuss how executives at Enron in practice created an organizational culture that put the 
bottom line ahead of ethical behavior and doing what’s right” (Sims and Brinkmann 2003, p. 
243).  “In retrospect, the leadership of Enron almost certainly dictated the company’s outcome 
through their own actions by providing perfect conditions for unethical behavior” (Sims and 
Brinkmann 2003, p. 250). 
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In 2002, two Tyco executives were indicted on charges that they procured $600 million 
through a racketeering scheme involving stock fraud, unauthorized bonuses and falsified expense 
accounts (Sorkin 2002a).  An investigation subsequently revealed that “Tyco's former chief 
executive, L. Dennis Kozlowski, systematically created a corporate culture of greed and excess, 
secretly authorizing the forgiveness of tens of millions of dollars of loans to dozens of executives 
to keep their loyalty” (Sorkin 2002b). 
Most recently, Wells Fargo was subject to a $100 million fine from the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau for illegal sales practices by thousands of employees which 
involving the fraudulent creation of over one million unauthorized deposit accounts and over 
560,000 fraudulent credit card applications (Warren, Markey, Sanders and Hirono 2016).  In the 
Sales Practice Investigation Report issued by Independent Directors of the Board of Wells Fargo 
& Company as issued on April 10, 2017, the principal findings identify “[t]he root cause of sales 
practice failures was the distortion of the Community Bank’s sales culture and performance 
management system, which, when combined with aggressive sales management, created pressure 
on employees to sell unwanted or unneeded products to customers, and in some cases, to open 
unauthorized accounts” (par. 2, Wells Fargo & Company 2017).  “Aided by a culture of strong 
deference to management of the lines of business (embodied in the oft-repeated ‘run it like you 
own it’ mantra), the Community Bank’s senior leaders distorted the sales model and performance 
management system, fostering an atmosphere that prompted low quality sales and improper and 
unethical behavior” (page 4, Wells Fargo & Company 2017).  While anecdotal evidence supports 
the fact that management plays a role in setting the tone at the top, management’s attitudes and 
cognitive thinking has not yet been systematically and empirically measured and related to 
financial reporting quality. 
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In this study, broadly speaking, I extract linguistic markers of top managements’ attitudes 
and cognitive style from their responses to financial reporting queries from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) staff, and I relate the markers to the presence of concurrent 
material misstatements in the financial statements under scrutiny.  My study applies research 
showing that the words people use provide information about their beliefs, fears, thinking 
patterns, social relationships and personalities (Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan and Blackburn 2015).  
Specifically, the words people use in their daily lives can reveal important aspects of their social 
and psychological worlds (Pennebaker, Mehl, and Niederhoffer 2003).  Language analysis 
potentially allows the natural language of top management to be analyzed for characteristics, 
personality traits, and individual cognitive thought processes that would otherwise not be 
available and measurable.  The traits that are available from language analysis tools are 
presumably the same traits that guide top management when making decisions, judgments, and 
establishing the control environment.  Language analysis, therefore, provides a tool to extract 
managements’ attitudes and cognitive style and measure tone at the top.  
The text analysis program Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (“LIWC”) catalogs the 
emotional, cognitive, and structural components of individuals’ verbal and written speech 
(Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales, and Booth 2007, Pennebaker et al. 2015).  LIWC 
computes the percentage of words within various categories from normal speech samples 
(Pennebaker and Francis 1996).  The 2015 version of LIWC includes four summary measures: 
Analytical Thinking, Clout, Authenticity, and Emotional Tone.  LIWC identifies high analytical 
thinking from greater article use as the writer focuses on precise objects, goals, or plans.  The 
higher the degree of analytical thinking, the more formal, precise thinking by the author 
(Pennebaker, Chung, Frazee, Lavergne, and Beaver 2014).  A high degree of clout suggests that 
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the writer is writing from the perspective of high expertise and is confident (Kacewicz, 
Pennebaker, Davis, Jeon, and Graesser 2013).  Low clout suggests a more tentative and humble 
communication.  Authenticity captures the degree of honesty, or truth-telling, in the text.  High 
authenticity is associated with a more honest, disclosing text, while low authenticity suggests a 
more guarded form of communication (Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, and Richards 2003).  
Emotional Tone is based on the extent of negative and positive emotion words in the writing 
(Cohn, Mehl, and Pennebaker 2004).  High (positive) emotional tone is characterized by the use 
of words such as happy, good, or nice while low (negative) emotional tone is composed of words 
such as angry and guilty.  Having access to an individual’s written or spoken language can reveal 
individual underlining emotional and cognitive traits.  
Under the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the SEC’s Division of Corporate Finance 
formally initiated a requirement that SEC staff perform a review of publicly available filings for 
all public issuers at least once every three years (U.S. Congress 2002).1  The purpose of the SEC 
staff review is to monitor and enhance compliance with the applicable disclosure and accounting 
requirements.  The SEC staff prepares and sends a letter to top management commenting on 
errors or inconsistencies identified in the filed document selected for review, which may include 
registration statements, annual reports, quarterly reports, and other documents classified under 
section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (e.g., Form 8-K) filed by management.  In 
their correspondence, the SEC staff requests a response via a letter from top management.  
                                                          
1 Section 408(a) of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 states “The Commission shall review disclosures made by 
issuers reporting under section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (including reports filed on Form 10-K), 
and which have a class of securities listed on a national securities exchange or traded on an automated quotation 
facility of a national securities association, on a regular and systematic basis for the protection of investors.  Such 
review shall include a review of an issuer’s financial statement.” 
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Management must address the points raised by the SEC staff.  The correspondence between the 
SEC and management continues until the SEC is satisfied all points are resolved. 
To apply the linguistic marker approach to measuring management’s attitudes and 
cognitive style, I analyze management’s language available from the first publicly available 
response letter to the SEC after it was required under SOX.2  I obtain the population of comment 
letters to small-business issuers on their annual report Form 10-KSB with a fiscal year ending in 
the three-year window from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2007.  Because management of 
large, public filers are more likely to request the assistance of their external auditors, legal 
counsel, or consultants to assist with composing a response to the SEC, I use the population of 
small business issuers who receive comment letters from the SEC staff.  Responses crafted by 
consultants likely would have little or none of top managements’ language and would not capture 
the cognitive style and attitude of management, limiting the inferences and conclusion of my 
work.  I analyze an entity’s annual report because this document contains the collective financial 
results for the year and reflects all activity from the financial reporting system from the year. 
The SEC review process commences after the annual financial statements are filed with 
the SEC, and thus, any subsequent restatements after filing of the 10-KSB under review 
identifies a concurrent material misstatement that existed at the time of the production and 
compilation of the financial statements.  To identify filers with a concurrent material 
misstatement, I use the population of small business issuers who subsequently restate the 10-
KSB under SEC review after the initial 10-KSB filing for fiscal years ending between October 1, 
                                                          
2 The Securities and Exchange Commission released staff comment and filer response letters via only their online 
file storage website Electronic Data Gathering and Receiving (EDGAR) related to filings made after August 1, 2004 
or for fiscal years ended after August 1, 2004.  For fiscal years ended in August and September 2004, there were a 
limited number of company comment letters and responses made public likely to due to the combination of selected 
months and a lag associated with implementing the policy.  To maximize the sample size while obtaining the benefit 
of public release of the documents, I begin the three-year sample for fiscal years ended after October 1, 2004. 
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2004 and September 30, 2007.  I require the restatement to be identified as a 4.02 misstatement 
on SEC Form 8-K, which indicates the financial statements were restated because of a violation 
of GAAP.  I arrive at a sample of 50 usable responses with concurrent misstatements that I match 
to issuers whose financial statements subject to the first comment letter did not have an identified 
material misstatement using size- and industry-pair matching.  I match the sample of materially 
misstated filers under SEC review with filers of a similar size and in the same one-digit industry 
code that also received an initial comment letter, but who did not restate their annual financial 
statements due to a material accounting misstatement. 
I find, relative to a sample of similar firms without a concurrent material misstatement, 
higher analytical thinking increases the likelihood of a concurrent material misstatement while 
greater clout (more expertise, leadership and influence) decreases the likelihood of a concurrent 
material misstatement.  I find no significant relation between managements’ authenticity nor 
emotional tone of the response letters on a concurrent material misstatement.   
In addition, given that linguistic markers as representative traits of managements’ 
attitudes and cognitive thinking may not individually stand-alone, I use factor analysis to identify 
if the traits are interrelated.  Using principal component analysis, I find two distinct factors.  Of 
the two factors, only the factor composed of lower Analytical Thinking and higher Clout is 
statistically significant.  I find this factor reduces the Type 1 and Type 2 classification error rates 
of a logistic regression of concurrent material misstatement by 5% and 25%, respectively.   
Overall, my results suggest that top managements’ attitudes and cognitive style in the 
control environment, specifically, the degree of clout and analytical thinking exhibited by the 
CEO and CFO, are significant factors that impact financial reporting quality.  Managements’ 
clout and analytical thinking may influence external reporting, disclosures, and accounting 
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judgments directly through tone at the top and managements’ own judgments or indirectly 
through internal control over transaction processing. 
This dissertation proceeds as follows.  Chapter 2 provides background information on the 
control environment, the SEC filing review process, language analysis, and the text analysis 
application employed in this dissertation, LIWC.  Chapter 3 describes the theoretical research 
design and hypotheses.  Chapter 4 documents the sample, the empirical model, and descriptive 
statistics, while Chapter 5 presents the main results and robustness tests.  Finally, Chapter 6 
provides a summary and concluding remarks. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
This chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2.1, The Control Environment, provides 
background on components of a control environment as described in the Internal Control – 
Integrated Framework, provides support for the presumed role of management in the control 
environment, and describes how the control environment affects financial reporting quality.  
Section 2.2, SEC Filing Review Process, outlines the purpose and process of a filing review by 
the SEC as well as the nature of the communications between the SEC and management to 
articulate the process used to elicit a measure of “tone at the top.”  Section 2.3, Language 
Analysis, provides an understanding of how specific language use reflects an individual’s 
emotional state, personality, and other features of social relationships.  Section 2.4, Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count (“LIWC”) Software and Linguistic Markers, describes the 
computerized software used to analyze personal language to assess social, personality, cognitive, 
and biological processes.   
2.1 The Control Environment  
2.1.1 Overview of the Control Environment 
 The effect of an internal control system on financial reporting has long been of interest to 
academics, regulators, and investors (McMullen, Raghunandan, and Rama 1996; Kinney 2000; 
COSO 1992; National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987; AICPA 2001).  The 
nature of the design, implementation, and monitoring of an internal control system affects the 
strength and effectiveness of the system.  Both academic and anecdotal evidence has shown that 
a weak internal control system has been associated with financial reporting problems, errors, 
mistakes, and fraud. 
In 1985, the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting was established 
with a mission to identify causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial reporting and 
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document steps to reduce its incidence in light of fraudulent reporting associated with significant 
business failures in the 1980s.  Usually referred to by the name of its chairman, former SEC 
Commissioner James C. Treadway, Jr., the “Treadway Commission” was jointly sponsored and 
funded by five private accounting organizations: the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA), the American Accounting Association (AAA), the Financial Executive 
Institute (FEI), the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), and the National Association of 
Accountants (NAA).  In 1987, the Treadway Commission issued a seminal report, the Report of 
the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, documenting, among other 
findings, the need for entities to address the tone set by top management and to maintain internal 
controls that provide reasonable assurance that fraudulent financial reporting will be prevented or 
subject to early detection (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987).3  
Specifically, the first three recommendations of the report focus on “an element within the 
company of overriding importance in preventing fraudulent financial reporting: the tone set by 
top management that influences the corporate environment within which financial reporting 
occurs” (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987).   
As a follow up to these findings, in 1992, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission (“COSO”) issued the Internal Control – Integrated Framework that 
provided a standardized guidance for businesses and other entities to assess and improve their 
internal control systems.  The COSO 1992 Internal Control – Integrated Framework formally 
defined an internal control as: 
                                                          
3 From Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, the Commission's recommendations 
for the public company deal with (1) the tone set by top management, (2) the internal accounting and audit 
functions, (3) the audit committee, (4) management and audit committee reports, (5) the practice of seeking second 
opinions from independent public accountants, and (6) quarterly reporting. (National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting 1987) 
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. . . a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other 
personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
objectives in the following categories:  
 Effectiveness and efficiency of operations 
 Reliability of financial reporting 
 Compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
 
This descriptive definition formally established that management plays a role in effecting 
controls of an internal control system to achieve reliable financial reporting.  However, the 
internal control system is not solely composed of the internal control processes in place, but 
rather is an integrated system with multiple components, all of which are presumed to be effected 
by management. 
The Internal Control – Integrated Framework establishes that an internal control system 
is composed of five interrelated components: Risk Assessment; Control Activities; Information 
and Communication; Monitoring; and Control Environment.  Risk assessment is the 
identification and analysis of relevant risks to achievement of the established entity objectives, 
forming a basis for determining how the risks should be managed (COSO 1992).  Control 
activities are the policies and procedures that help ensure management directives are carried out 
(COSO 1992).  The information and communication component reflects the need for pertinent 
information to be identified, captured, and communicated in a form and timeframe that enables 
people to carry out their responsibilities (COSO 1992).   
Risk assessments, control activities, and information and communication may be 
assessed, identified, and categorized at the transactional level of record of the entity.  Monitoring 
assesses the quality of an internal control system’s performance over time using ongoing 
monitoring activities, separate evaluations, or a combination of the two (COSO 1992).  The 
internal control system is designed, implemented, and monitored in the control environment.  
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Consequently, the control environment is the foundation for all other components of internal 
control, providing discipline and structure (COSO 1992).   
2.1.2 Factors of the Control Environment 
The control environment is pervasive in nature and describes the conditions in which an 
internal control system operates.  Specifically, under COSO 1992, the descriptive factors of a 
control environment include the integrity, ethical values, and competence of the entity’s people; 
management’s philosophy and operating style; the way management assigns authority and 
responsibility, and organizes and develops its people; and the attention and direction provided by 
the board of directors (COSO 1992).  Some of these pervasive components of the control 
environment have been studied individually in research, as described below. 
Patelli and Pedrini (2015) use corporate narrative language from annual letters to 
shareholders to test whether specific leadership traits are associated with unethical accounting 
practices.  They identify leadership traits captured through thematic indicators in CEO letters and 
find using aggressive financial reporting is positively associated with CEO letters using a 
language that is resolute, complex, and not engaging (Patelli and Pedrini 2015). 
Using self-reported surveys, D’Aquila (1998) investigates whether three forces of the 
control environment – tone at the top, codes of conduct, and pressure of short-term performance 
targets – are related to financial reporting decisions.  She surveys CPAs responsible for financial 
reporting and asks if they would misrepresent financial statements for six accounting dilemmas.  
She finds that respondents who perceive a tone at the top of their organization that fosters ethical 
behavior are less likely to misrepresent financial information.  However, she finds no significant 
relationship between the likelihood to misreport and the implementation of codes of conduct or 
pressure to achieve short-term performance targets. 
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Additional research has considered the control environment using insights about the 
Board of Directors from COSO 1992 and from Fama and Jensen’s (1983) theory that the Board 
of Directors serves as the ultimate control mechanism providing oversight of the actions of 
management.  Thus, research has investigated the characteristics of the Board of Directors to 
analyze their effect on financial reporting quality.  For example, Beasley (1996) studies whether 
board composition differs for firms experiencing financial statement fraud and finds no-fraud 
firms have significantly higher percentages of outside directors than fraud firms.  When 
investigating the effect of the Board of Directors on the probability of restatement, Agrawal and 
Chadha (2005) and Baber, Kang, and Liang (2010) find no relationship between restatements 
and independent boards.  Abbott, Parker, and Presley (2012) study the role of female board 
presence on the likelihood of financial restatement and find the presence of at least one woman 
on the board is associated with a lower likelihood of restatement.  Using the magnitude of 
abnormal accruals as a proxy for earnings management, Klein (2002) finds significant negative 
associations between abnormal accruals and the percent of outside directors on the board.  
 While employees are active participants in an internal control system by performing 
transaction processes, control activities, and monitoring activities, management is presumed to 
play a defining role in establishing the control environment.  In their seminal report, Treadway 
Commission noted that “The tone set by top management – the corporate environment of culture 
within which financial reporting occurs – is the most important factor contributing to the 
integrity of the financial reporting process” (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting 1987).  Building on the Treadway Commission, COSO 1992 specifically isolates the 
role of the CEO by stating that “[m]ore than any other individual, the chief executive officer sets 
the ‘tone at the top’ that affects integrity and ethics and other factors of a positive control 
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environment” (COSO 1992).  “Tone at the top” is generally understood as the level of 
commitment toward openness, honesty, integrity, and ethical behavior as embodied by the 
actions, directives, and behaviors of an organization’s leaders (Gartland 2015).   
Therefore, the tone set by top management is presumed to serve as the guiding factor for 
prioritizing and establishing the foundation of the internal control system – the control 
environment.  The responsibility of management extends to include the nature of communication 
with employees.  When documenting the role of communication, COSO 1992 emphasizes 
management’s role by stating, “All personnel must receive a clear message from top 
management that control responsibilities must be taken seriously” (COSO 1992).   
One way management formally communicates their priorities is through development and 
use of a corporate code of conduct.  A number of articles have studied the role of a code of 
conduct, but have failed to identify a measurable impact from these corporate communications.  
As noted earlier, D’Aquila (1998) surveyed employees responsible for financial reporting and 
found the existence of a code of conduct had no significant effect on financial reporting 
decisions.  Similarly, Rich, Smith, and Mihalek (1990) surveyed management accountants and 
found no significant differences regarding the perception of how difficult it would be to hide an 
ethical problem or of how high the risk of exposure would be between companies with a code of 
conduct and those without a code of conduct (p. 35).  In an experiment, Brief, Dukerich, Brown, 
and Brett (1996) find no effects of codes of conduct and the degree of specificity in the codes of 
conduct on the incidence of fraudulent decisions.  Rich et al. (1990) and Brief et al. (1996) both 
conclude that management should focus their attention on establishing and sustaining an ethical 
environment in lieu of codes of conduct, noting that high ethical standards come from 
individuals not written codes.  
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COSO supports the findings of Rich et al. (1990) and Brief et al. (1996) by linking the 
control environment to its effect on the decisions and actions of employees.  Specifically, COSO 
describes the control environment as setting “tone of an organization, influencing the control 
consciousness of its people” (COSO 1992).  Therefore, it is not only presumed that management 
is directly setting the tone of the organization, but it is also presumed that management is 
leading/guiding employees through the control environment.   
2.1.3 Manager Traits and their Relation to the Control Environment 
Given the fact that top management is presumed to establish “tone at the top,” it is 
important to understand if – or how – the personal characteristics of management play a role in 
establishing “tone at the top” and the control environment.  Accounting, economic and 
management literatures have all shown that the individual managers affect firm behavior and 
financial measures.  Specifically, individual managers have been shown to play a role in 
operating decisions, financial performance, financial reporting decisions, and financial reporting 
quality (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Bamber, Jiang and Wang 2010, Chatterjee and Hambrick 
2007, Olsen, Dworkis, and Young 2014, Jia, van Lent, and Zeng 2014, Schrand and Zechman 
2012).  These studies are briefly described below. 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) use a manager-firm matched panel data set to track managers 
across different firms over time and find that managers uniquely affect corporate decisions, 
indicating a manager fixed-effect or individual characteristic of a manager plays a measurable 
role in corporate policy and operating decisions.  Manager fixed effects are related to financial 
policy, including interest coverage and dividend payouts, as well as cost-cutting policies 
(Bertrand and Schoar 2003).  Following a similar empirical design, Bamber, Jiang and Wang 
(2010) find top executives exert unique and economically significance on their firms’ voluntary 
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management forecasts.  Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) focus on one specific management 
characteristic – narcissism – and show narcissistic CEOs favor bold strategies through the 
volume and size of acquisitions. Olsen, Dworkis, and Young (2014) also identify narcissist 
CEOs to show narcissist CEOs are more likely to increase reported EPS through real and 
operational activities.  Jia, van Lent, and Zeng (2014) examine the relationship between male 
CEOs’ facial masculinity and financial misreporting and find a positive relationship between 
masculinity and the likelihood of financial misreporting.  Finally, Schrand and Zechman (2012) 
find that overconfident executives are more likely to exhibit an optimistic bias and likely to 
intentionally misstate earnings.  As they find greater overconfidence leads to distorted decisions 
including financial reporting decisions, the authors highlight the need to recognize the 
consequences of overconfidence (Schrand and Zechman 2012).  Their analysis provides 
motivation to consider how personal characteristics of management that drive “tone at the top” 
and the control environment relate to an entity’s financial reporting quality. 
COSO 1992 identifies one specific personal characteristic of a manager when describing 
the components of a control environment - the role of “management’s philosophy and operating 
style.”  Given that management traits and other manager fixed-effects have been show to affect 
various operational and financial corporate outputs, and management is presumed to establish the 
control environment, it remains a natural question to ask how management’s philosophy and 
operating style effects financial reporting quality.  Under COSO 1992, “[m]anagement may be in 
a position to override controls and ignore or stifle communications from subordinates, enabling a 
dishonest management which intentionally misrepresents results to cover its tracks.”  
Management override blatantly ignores the control activities in place and circumvents the 
established procedures to avoid checks that could thwart or cease intentional misstatements.  
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Consequently, management override is presumed to be willful misbehavior.  Management 
override is assumed to be a decision of the manager and the manager alone and is therefore, a 
function of the manager’s specific personality traits and operating style.  Given the lack of 
oversight of management on a daily basis and the responsibility of management in the internal 
system, management override is an inherent limitation on internal control reliance.  Indeed, in 
their seminal report, Treadway Commission noted that “The tone set by top management – the 
corporate environment of culture within which financial reporting occurs – is the most important 
factor contributing to the integrity of the financial reporting process. Notwithstanding an 
impressive set of rules and procedures, if the tone set by management is lax, fraudulent financial 
reporting is more likely to occur.” (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
1987). 
In summary, given the fact that top management is presumed to establish “tone at the 
top,” it is important to understand if – or how – the personal characteristics of management can 
play a role in establishing “tone at the top” and the control environment.  A CEO or CFO who 
overrides controls, fails to act with integrity, or fails to adhere to regulatory rules or requirements 
exhibits a “poor” or weak control environment and increases the risk of a misstatement in the 
financial reporting process.  Management may make poor decisions about the nature, extent, and 
timing of internal controls when establishing a system of internal controls.  Employees then 
adhere to these misguided processes, as employees and management operate in the control 
environment and make judgments to record transactions, apply and adhere to financial 
accounting and reporting regulations, and decide on financial disclosure and external reporting 
decisions.  Further, management may fail to send a clear message to prioritize and value control 
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activities or inform and assist employees with overriding controls.  Employees then work and 
operate in compromised/lax control environment.   
In addition, management may make biased judgments based on personal incentives, lack 
of integrity, and unethical intentions that impact the financial reporting process or the financial 
statements, including judgment when applying accounting principles and assessing accounting 
estimates.  Consequently, financial reports may be intentionally or unintentionally misstated.  
COSO addresses the fact that an internal control system will never provide absolute 
certainty of reliable financial reporting and compliance with laws and regulations due to “the 
realities that judgments in decision making can be faulty, and that breakdowns can occur because 
of simple error or mistake” (COSO 1992).  A pervasively weak control environment has the 
power to spread and alter decisions of employees and management to engage in unlawful or 
risky practices “as controls can be circumvented by the collusion of two or more people, and 
management has the ability to override the system” (COSO 1992).  Consequently, problems in 
the control environment may drive issues with reliable financial reporting either directly through 
management’s accounting judgments or indirectly through internal controls.  
2.1.4 Why Don’t We Know More About the Control Environment?  
While prior research has documented the role of codes of conduct and the board of 
directors as an oversight mechanism in the control environment, we know surprisingly little 
about a company’s “tone at the top.”  Even though some public companies must disclose the 
effectiveness of their internal controls and any identified any weaknesses therein on their annual 
financial statements (see additional discussion on this below), they are not required to 
specifically assess, determine, or report on their overall “tone at the top.”  Further, management 
would be reluctant to admit if the “tone at the top” is poor, due to the embarrassing nature of 
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such a self-admission.  While COSO (1992) provides a framework for public companies to 
follow, entities were not required to externally or publicly report on the operating effectiveness 
of their internal control system, including the control environment at that time.  However, in 
2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that required assessment and reporting.  SOX 
Section 404(a) mandates that each annual financial statement contain an internal control report 
which is required to:  
(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate 
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and  
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting. 
 
As explained below, these SOX assessment and reporting requirements are largely 
required only for larger companies, leaving smaller companies exempt from these disclosures.  
While the internal control reporting mandate was implemented and enforced upon accelerated 
filers in 2002, non-accelerated filers and small business issuers were provided additional time to 
implement this requirement and were not required to comply with these reporting requirements 
until after fiscal years ending after December 15, 2007.4   
SOX also included the requirement that an entity’s independent accounting firm test and 
report on the effectiveness of the internal control system under Section 404(b) (U.S. Congress 
2002).  Accelerated filers, issuers with a public float of at least $75 million, were deemed to have 
the resources and capacity to undergo an audit to implement this external reporting requirement, 
but non-accelerated filers and small business issuers were initially given an extension to prepare 
                                                          
4 In 2002, accelerated filers were defined as issuers with public float of at least $75 million, that have been subject to 
the Exchange Act’s reporting requirements for at least 12 calendar months, that previously have filed at least one 
annual report, and that are not eligible to file their quarterly and annual reports on Forms 10-QKSB and 10-KSB 
using scaled disclosure requirements.  Small business issuers were defined as issuers with less than $25 million in 
annual revenue and public market float of less than $25 million.  Non-accelerated filers were issuers with less than 
$75 million of public float, but were not eligible to be small business issuers. 
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for this requirement.  However, prior to implementation, regulation was signed into federal law 
in 2010 that permanently exempts a new classification of companies, small public companies, 
defined as issuers with less than $75 million in public float, from auditor attestation over the 
effectiveness of an internal control system.5  The burden of extra work required was deemed too 
high for small public companies. 
Finally, in a large organization, the responsibility of more transaction-based and less 
pervasive internal controls, such as procedural control activities, fall to senior managers or other 
individuals reporting to top management.  However, in smaller organizations, companies may 
lack the capacity or volume of employees to justify such a corporate hierarchy.  Consequently, 
the management of a smaller issuer is likely to have a more direct role in the internal control 
system (COSO 1992).  This setting further increases the emphasis on the role of management on 
tone at the top, increases the risk of a material misstatement, and creates a riskier control 
environment for smaller organization in the financial reporting process.   
2.2 SEC Filing Review Process 
The key premise of the research design for this paper is that management’s response to 
SEC comment letters provide natural language that can reveal insights into the manager’s 
philosophy and operating style.  Because I rely on small company filers (as explained in more 
detail above in Section 2.1.4 and in Section 3.2), I study a sample where it is more likely that the 
CEO and/or CFO personally will have written the response to the SEC, thereby capturing their 
attitudes and cognitive style.  Because they are top management, this design choice allows me 
the best opportunity for language analysis to capture the tone at the top.  The nature of the 
communication between the SEC and company management is explained below. 
                                                          
5 The Dodd-Frank Act exempts small public companies from the SOX Section 404(b) requirement that the 
company's independent auditor attest to management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls. 
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In addition to requiring public reporting and attestation of an entity’s internal controls 
over financial reporting, SOX mandated additional steps and regulatory oversight by the SEC.  
Specifically, under Section 408 Enhanced review of periodic disclosures by issuers of SOX, the 
SEC Division of Corporate Finance formally initiated the requirement to perform a filing review 
of publicly available filings for all public registrants at least once every three years (U.S. 
Congress 2002).  The purpose of the review is to monitor and enhance compliance with the 
applicable disclosure and accounting requirements.  A filing review could be performed on any 
number of selected filings of a public corporation including 10-K, 10-Q or registration document 
(i.e. S-1) by SEC staff at the Division of Corporate Finance.  Upon completion of a review, the 
SEC staff sends a written letter to top management and identifies instances where it believes a 
company can improve its disclosure or enhance its compliance with disclosure requirements.   
Key to my dissertation is that in the correspondence, the SEC staff requests a reply via a 
letter from top management.  Management is required to address the points raised by the SEC in 
a response letter.  This comment and response process continues until the staff and the company 
resolve the comments.  When the SEC completes a filing review, the SEC makes public the 
comment letters and management’s response letters on the Electronic Data Gathering and 
Receiving (EDGAR) system, no earlier than 20 business days after completion.  
Existing accounting literature has studied aspects of the SEC review process and 
production of comment letters, but has not studied how managements’ written responses to those 
letters might yield insights into the tone at the top as I do in this dissertation.  Robinson, Xux, 
and Yu (2011) find that compensation disclosure defects identified by the SEC are positively 
associated with excess CEO compensation and media criticism in the previous year.  Boone, 
Linthicum, and Poe (2013) find that the probability of an SEC comment letter increases with 
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rules-based characteristics in the standard while the extent of accounting estimate discussion in 
the standard is positively associated with both the probability of an SEC comment and the time 
to resolve the comment.  This research confirms that the SEC considers the estimates to be of 
higher risk in the financial reporting process and focuses their attention accordingly.  Cassell, 
Dreher, and Myers (2013) find that low profitability, high complexity, a small outside audit firm, 
and weak governance are positively associated with the receipt of an SEC comment letter, the 
extent of comments, and the cost of remediation.  Although this latter study does link weak 
governance to SEC comment letters, their measure of weak corporate governance, duality in the 
CEO and chairman positions, may reflect limited oversight; however, it is a very limited 
reflection of tone at the top – which is the focus of this dissertation.   
2.3 Language Analysis  
 The words people use in their daily lives can reveal important aspects of their social and 
psychological worlds (Pennebaker et al. 2003).  Recently, language analysis examines personal 
traits of the individual speaking or writing – traits previously overlooked or unavailable from 
written text.  Research has identified that the words people use provide information about their 
beliefs, fears, thinking patterns, social relationships, and personalities. 
 Psychology research has found often-overlooked function words – including pronouns, 
prepositions, articles, conjunctions, and auxiliary verbs – reveal the linguistic style of the writer 
and have a powerful impact on the reader (Chung and Pennebaker 2007).  At the same time, the 
style reflects a great deal about the writer (Chung and Pennebaker 2007).  Function words differ 
from content words.  Content words are nouns and verbs that describe the linguistic content or 
topic of the written or spoken text.  Function words serve as the cement that holds the content 
words together and reflect the linguistic style, that is, how people put their words together to 
create a message (Chung and Pennebaker 2007).  As markers of language style, function words 
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have been shown to reflect emotional states, personality, and other features of social 
relationships (Chung and Pennebaker 2007, Kacewicz et al. 2013).  From a psychological 
perspective, function words reflect how people are communicating, whereas content words 
convey what they are saying (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010).  Function words tend to be more 
reliable markers of psychological states than content words such as nouns and regular verbs 
(Pennebaker 2011).  For example, the use of the first-person singular “I” indicates attention on 
the self and is associated with negative affective states and depression (Rude, Gortner, and 
Pennebaker 2004, Weintraub 1989). 
  Language analysis and the related tools available for analyzing language, allow the 
natural language of top management to be analyzed for characteristics, personality traits, and 
individual cognitive thought processes that would otherwise not be available.  I argue that the 
same traits that are available from language analysis tools are the same traits that guide top 
management when making decisions, judgments, and establishing the control environment.  
Language analysis, therefore, provides a potentially useful tool to extract managements’ attitudes 
and cognitive style and measure tone at the top.  The idea of using language analysis in business 
settings is not new, as it has been employed to analyze corporate texts to detect financial 
misreporting and to assess fraud risk (Burns, Moffitt, Felix, and Burgoon 2010, Humpherys, 
Moffitt, Burns, Burgoon, and Felix 2011, Larcker and Zakolyukina 2012, Loughran and 
McDonald 2011a, Loughran and McDonald 2011b, Purda and Skillicorn 2015).  It has not, 
however, been used to capture tone at the top, as I do in this dissertation.  
2.4 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (“LIWC”) Software & Linguistic Markers 
To study tone at the top, I rely on research by Pennebaker and his co-authors to “tap into” 
the mind of the letter writer, thereby capturing management’s attitudes and cognitive style 
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directing the “tone at the top.”  Specifically, the text analysis program Linguistic Inquiry and 
Word Count (“LIWC”) was designed to efficiently and effectively study the various emotional, 
cognitive, and structural components present in individuals’ verbal and written speech 
(Pennebaker et al. 2007, Pennebaker et al. 2015).  LIWC is a computer-based analysis technique 
that computes the percentage of words within various categories that writers or speakers use in 
normal speech samples (Pennebaker and Francis 1996).  LIWC relies on an internal default 
dictionary that defines what words should be counted in the target text files (Pennebaker et al. 
2015).   
The LIWC2015 Dictionary is the heart of the text analysis strategy and is composed of 
almost 6,400 words, word stems, and select emoticons that fall into approximately 90 word 
categories (Pennebaker et al. 2015).  Each category is composed of relevant list of words.  For 
example, the category “negate” includes words that serve to contradict a statement including no, 
not, and never.  LIWC processes one word at a time from a text file and identifies whether the 
word is included in the LIWC dictionary.  If the word is matched with a word in the dictionary, 
the appropriate word category scale (or scales) for that word is incremented (Pennebaker et al. 
2015).  The LIWC output is a list of all word categories and the percentage of words included in 
each category.  In addition, LIWC outputs include a count of the number of words, the average 
number of words per sentence, and the percentage of words in excess of six letters.  Appendix A 
provides a complete list of all word categories. 
Use of LIWC to analyze text has allowed researchers to understand the link between 
language use and social, personality, cognitive, and biological processes.  For example, in Berry,  
Pennbaker, Mueller, and Hiller (1997), the categories of negative and positive emotion words 
were based on the burgeoning literature on affect, mood, and emotion and tap such dimensions 
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as anger, depression, guilt, optimism, and serenity.  Cognitive mechanisms involve words that 
reveal different modes of thought.  This dimension incorporates words that depict causal 
thinking, although not specific styles of attribution.  These include categories such as self-
reflection (i.e. understand, think); discrepancy, or undoing (i.e., should, would, could); causation 
(i.e., because, effect); and achievement or striving (i.e. attempt, solve, achieve).  Using LIWC 
output, Pennebaker and King (1999) find the use of “exclusion words” or differentiation such as 
but, except, without, and exclude are associated with greater cognitive complexity.  Using 
multiple experiments where people have been induced to describe or explain something honestly 
or deceptively, the combined use of first-person singular pronouns and differentiation predicts 
honesty (Chung and Pennebaker 2007, Newman et al. 2003).   
Key to my dissertation is that the 2015 version of LIWC included four summary 
measures: Analytical thinking, Clout, Authenticity, and Emotional Tone.  Each summary variable 
was derived from previously published findings and converted to percentiles based on 
standardized scores from large comparison samples (Pennebaker et al. 2015).  These additional 
measures are described in Section 3.2.  As described in greater detail in Chapter 3, applying 
LIWC, I use natural language from top management to extract linguistic measures of 
management characteristics that drive corporate tone at the top.  I then assess how these 
management traits affect financial reporting quality through empirical analysis.  
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Research Design and Hypotheses 
This chapter describes my conceptual research design and hypotheses.  The conceptual 
design is laid out in Section 3.1, while Section 3.2 describes the predicted relationships between 
each of my four measures of management’s attitude and cognitive style and financial reporting 
quality, as previously described in Section 2.4.   
3.1 Conceptual Research Design  
At the conceptual level, this dissertation aims to link a management-established corporate 
tone at the top to financial reporting quality under the presumed causal relation of managements’ 
attitudes and cognitive style to financial reporting quality.  Operationally, I use the four summary 
measures of Analytical Thinking, Clout, Authenticity, and Emotional Tone to capture 
managements’ characteristics that drive tone at the top as the causal factors.  To generate these 
four summary measures, I rely on managements’ responses to SEC comment letters issued to 
small public company filers beginning the first year they were publicly available.  Management 
of small companies are inclined to write their own responses to the SEC compared to 
management of large, public filers who are more likely to request the assistance of external 
auditors, legal counsel, or consultants.  The written correspondence of small public filers to the 
SEC provides the best opportunity to capture the real attitudes and cognitive style of the 
company CEOs and CFOs.  I rely on Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (“LIWC”) software that 
has been extensively validated as a mechanism to capture an individual’s cognitive 
characteristics using language through the four summary measures.  To capture the construct of 
the presumed outcome, financial reporting quality, I determine actual accounting mistakes and 
intentional errors by identifying an accounting restatement classified as a 4.02 misstatement on 
the company’s Form 8-K, which indicates management’s determination that the financial 
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statements are being restated because of a violation of GAAP.  This operational measure is 
designed to capture the existence of a (concurrent) material misstatement in the company’s 
financial statements that were the basis for the SEC staff’s initial comment letter. 
 Based on the outline of the regulatory environment induced by SOX in 2002 as discussed 
in Section 2.1, the small companies and years under investigation in my sample do not have to 
disclose any aspect of their internal control environment.  Specifically, small business issuers did 
not have comply with SOX 404(a) and the required disclosure of management’s assessment of 
internal controls until under after December 15, 2007.  One purpose of SOX 404(a) was for 
management to identify underlying control activities and the constraints’ in the control 
environment that increase the risk of material misstatement.  Without the reporting requirement 
of SOX 404(a) and SOX 404(b), neither management’s assessment nor the independent auditor’s 
report testing the effectiveness and hence, the financial statement reporting risk implications of 
the established internal control system are available.   
Because there are no externally available data on management’s role in establishing and 
overseeing the control environment, it is not possible to ascertain the state of the control 
environment from the annual financial statements the way it is possible for larger companies 
subject to regulatory review.  Further, the possible lack of attention by management and 
independent auditor oversight due to limited and less stringent reporting requirements may 
increase the risk of a control failure for my sample.  Specifically, lack of oversight of the control 
environment may increase the risk of a material internal control failure, as the control 
environment is pervasive in nature, affecting control processes throughout the company.  
 Management has been identified as the primary responsible party in corporate 
governance for establishing and driving the pervasive control environment.  In COSO 1992 
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Internal Control - Integrated Framework, the Treadway Commission notes that more than any 
other individual, the chief executive officer sets the “tone at the top” that affects integrity and 
ethics and other factors of a positive control environment (COSO 1992).  Management’s 
decisions around establishing, maintaining, and monitoring control environment may impact the 
quality of the control environment that provides oversight of risk assessment, control activities, 
and information and monitoring activities, and hence the quality of the internal control system.  
Thus, lack of data has led to little research that explores the role of the control environment – and 
management’s role in establishing the control environment – on financial reporting quality.  
However, given the obvious and apparent link of the internal control system to financial 
reporting quality enforced by SOX, the role of management in the pervasive control environment 
should be of key interest to investors, regulators, and other uses of the financial statements as 
they seek to understand elements of SOX, assumptions of COSO, and implications for financial 
reporting quality.   
Existing literature has documented the role of manager fixed-effects on the investment, 
financial, and organizational practices of a corporation (Bertrand and Schoar 2003).  Managers 
are often perceived as having their own “styles” when making investment, financing, and other 
strategic decisions, thereby imprinting their personal marks on the companies they manage 
(Bertrand and Schoar 2003).  Considering this known and tested connection, it is likely the 
personal traits of a manager that drive investing, financing, and strategic business decisions 
influence the internal control system.  Specifically, I consider the traits of management that may 
play a role in the pervasive control environment and in the design, implementation and oversight 
of controls.  I measure the attitudes and cognitive style of top management to determine whether 
these elements of the control environment are related to an entity’s financial reporting quality.  
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While other research has proxied for tone at the top using the existence or content of codes of 
conduct (Rich et al. 1990), I identify and implement a direct measure to capture management 
traits that drive tone at the top.  
 In this paper, I offer a unique option to address the inability to measure and thus ascertain 
an understanding of the control environment from the lack financial reporting requirements.  
Specifically, I identify a manager’s imprint – or specific management traits – by analyzing the 
language used by management in the conduct of their statutory responsibilities.  From this 
analysis, I am able to identify attitudes and cognitive style of top management.  These 
management specific attitudes and cognitive style are the same attitudes and cognitive traits that 
serve as the basis for the control environment.  I relate these attitudes and cognitive traits to the 
control environment to ascertain if the pervasive “tone at the top” and philosophy under COSO 
relates to financial reporting quality.   
I analyze the language of top management of a small business issuer available from a 
letter written to the SEC in response to a filing review of annual financial statements on Form 
10-KSB (elaborated below).  While any public filings could be subject to a SEC filing review, I 
analyze response letters written on the annual financial statements as this filing has the most 
comprehensive disclosure requirements.  The annual statements include the cumulative results of 
the quarterly filings (i.e., 10-QSB) and activity throughout the year.  The financial statement 
reporting process underlying the production of the 10-KSB incorporates internal controls and 
managements’ accounting judgment.  Finally, the annual financial statements are subject to an 
audit and if a material misstatement is subsequently identified, management will need to restate 
the financial statements, which provides a measure of financial reporting quality.   
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To analyze management’s attitudes and cognitive style, I extract management’s language 
from the first letter written by management in response to a SEC comment letter.  Management 
of large, public filers have long been required to respond to SEC staff reviews, as their market 
capitalization, the economic significance of their financial transactions, or the volume of investor 
risk warrants the attention of the SEC staff.  In contrast, small public filers may have been of 
lower interest and concern of the SEC and would have been less likely to be subject to scrutiny.  
This economic-based decision model in place at the SEC changed when SOX was passed and 
mandated all public companies be subject to a review at least one every three years.  In addition, 
management of large, public companies may request the assistance of their external auditors, in-
house legal counsel, or consultants to assist with composing a response to the SEC.  Smaller 
public issuers are less likely to have access to these resources.  Therefore, I use the population of 
small business issuers who receive comment letters from the SEC. 
Small business issuers follow Regulation S-B when filing periodic reports and 
registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.  Under Regulation S-B, a company qualifies as a small business issuer if it has (1) less 
than $25 million in public float and (2) less than $25 million in annual revenue.6  Therefore, 
small business issuers may not have the financial resources or reputational incentives to turn to 
auditors, lawyers, or other third-parties for assistance when preparing a response to the SEC.  
Consequently, the response letters to the SEC from small business issuers are more likely be 
written solely by management and more likely capture the attitudes and cognitive style of 
                                                          
6Effective February 4, 2008, the disclosure requirements in Regulation S-B were replaced and incorporated into 
Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X and these qualifications were altered.  As my sample predates this change, all 
data was subject to Regulation S-B.  Refer to SEC Release No. 33-8876 for more information.  
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management compared to response letters to the SEC from companies classified as accelerated 
or non-accelerated filers.  
Language analysis and the related tools available for analyzing language, allow the 
natural language of top management to be analyzed for characteristics, personality traits, and 
individual cognitive thought processes that would otherwise not be available.  The same traits 
that are available from language analysis tools are the same traits that guide top management 
when making decisions, judgments, and establishing the control environment.  Language 
analysis, therefore, provides an ideal tool to extract managements’ attitudes and cognitive style 
and measure tone at the top. 
Following prior research, I measure poor financial reporting quality as a concurrent 
misstatement for the fiscal year under review by the SEC.  Evidence of concurrent misstatements 
are identified by observing subsequent records to ascertain if a restatement is eventually 
announced for the fiscal year reviewed.  I then obtain text of the letter written by management in 
response to SEC comment letters received during the review process and extract linguistic 
markers of attitudes and cognitive style using text analysis Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 
(“LIWC”) software.  I also select a size- and industry-match sample for each of the materially 
misstated issuer-fiscal years to arrive at matched pairs.  This process is depicted in Figure 1: 
Research Design and SEC Review Process Timeline.  I then estimate the effect of attitudes and 
cognitive style on financial reporting quality using matched sample tests (Erickson, Hanlon, and 
Maydew 2006, Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson 2007, Armstrong, Larcker, Ormazabal, and 
Taylor 2013). 
The theoretical and operational research design choices are modeled in the predictive 
validity framework included in Figure 2.  
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3.2  Hypotheses 
This section describes the four hypotheses that form the primary tests of this thesis.  Each 
of the four hypothesis proposes the effect of one of the four summary measures of management’s 
attitudes and cognitive thinking identified from LIWC  - Analytical Thinking, Clout, Authenticity, 
and Emotional Tone - on financial reporting quality as measured by a subsequent restatement of 
the financial statements under review in the SEC comment letter.  These four summary measures 
are designed to capture managements’ attitudes and cognitive style underlying and driving the 
tone at the top.  The subsequent restatements identify the existence of a concurrent material 
misstatement during the company’s fiscal year.  
3.2.1 Analytical Thinking 
The measure of analytical thinking is based on work performed and documented in 
Pennebaker et al. (2014).  This measure seeks to capture the psychological or cognitive thought 
processes of the writer or speaker.  In Pennebaker et al. (2014), the authors’ analyzed college 
admission essays for the use of function words, including pronouns, articles, prepositions, 
conjunctions, auxiliary verbs, negations, and common adverbs.  They find distinct variation in 
essays.  At one end of the spectrum, essays written with high degree of analytical thinking are 
composed of high rates of articles and prepositions with formal and precise descriptions of 
categories (i.e., objects, goals, and plans).  These essays display heightened abstract thinking 
(associated with greater article use) and cognitive complexity (associated with greater use of 
prepositions) (Pennebaker et al. 2014).  In contrast, essays at the other end of the distribution 
contain high rates of pronouns, auxiliary verbs, conjunctions, adverbs and negation and reflect 
low levels of analytical thinking.   
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The use of pronouns and auxiliary verbs have been associated with time-based stories and 
reflect a more personal, narrative language style (Pennebaker et al. 2014).  The authors correlate 
the use of function words from the essays and academic performance across all four years of 
college and found that only articles and prepositions – components of high analytical thinking – 
were positively correlated with GPA.  They also show the function words of narrative, dynamic 
language or low analytical thinking (pronouns, auxiliary verbs, etc.) were negatively correlated 
with GPA.  These findings reveal that analytical thinking and cognitive complexity is more 
rewarded in higher education. 
As explained below, I hypothesize that analytical thinking is potentially related to the risk 
of concurrent misstatements, although the direction of that relationship is unclear.  If 
management exhibits greater analytical thinking, the decisions and judgment of management 
may have a limited focus on one object, goal, or plan and may overlook the broader effect of 
judgments, increasing the risk of a concurrent misstatement.  To illustrate this idea, consider the 
statement made by Solitron Devices, Inc. in 2005 in their SEC response letter.  When asked to 
provide significant components of their accrued environmental expenses, the company response 
included the statement, “This best estimate of cleanup costs by the Company's environmental 
consultants is based on the assumption that the Plan and Consent Final Judgment will be 
implemented with respect to environmental liabilities.”  This statement appears to exhibit high 
analytical thinking as it provides a focused explanation for the basis of the expense and 
highlights the single assumption rationalizing the amount of the estimate.7 
In contrast, if management exhibits a low degree of analytical thinking, they may fail to 
properly analyze decisions and judgments, which arguably could increase the likelihood of a 
                                                          
7 The Analytical Thinking measure from LIWC for this sentence was 97.26 on a scale of 0 (low Analytical Thinking) 
to 100 (high Analytical Thinking).   
34 
 
concurrent misstatement.  To illustrate this idea, consider a SEC response letter by Crown 
NorthCorp. in 2005.  They argued to the SEC: “We believe the comment is inapplicable and that 
a revision of the report is unnecessary.”  This statement appears to exhibit low analytical 
thinking as it is obviously lacking analysis and cognitive complexity and reflects a more 
narrative, personal perspective.8 
Given the concept and these examples, it is not clear that higher analytical thinking will 
result in a concurrent material misstatement. Therefore, I hypothesize in the null:   
H10: Concurrent financial reporting misstatements are not related to the extent of 
management’s analytical thinking.   
3.2.2 Clout 
The measure of clout, or status, is based on work performed and documented in 
Kacewicz et al. (2013) and seeks to capture the extent of rapport or confidence exhibited by the 
writer or speaker.  The authors conduct a series of five studies to assess clout, classifying clout as 
synonymous with the constructs “status, power, expertise, leadership, and dominance” 
(Kacewicz et al. 2013, pg. 2).  The focus of this research is to explore the relative social rank 
between two individuals and to identify which dimensions of language are likely to provide 
valuable clues in identifying people’s place in the social hierarchy (Kacewicz et al. 2013).  The 
research focuses on the use of pronouns because pronouns often reveal the focus of the speaker’s 
attention.  For example, a person who feels insecure will likely pay more attention to their own 
personal feelings and consequently use more first-person singular pronouns (I, me, my).  When 
examining clout, the authors consider the attention or orientation of higher-status individuals and 
cite literature supporting that individuals who obtain status are less self-aware and more socially 
                                                          
8 The Analytical Thinking measure from LIWC for this sentence was 83.85 on a scale of 0 (low Analytical Thinking) 
to 100 (high Analytical Thinking).   
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attuned to what lower status people are thinking (Kacewicz et al. 2013).  Consequently, they 
predict and find individuals with greater clout use fewer first-person singular, more first-person 
plural (i.e., we, our), and more second-person singular (i.e., you), associated with attention 
focused on others lieu of oneself (Kacewicz et al. 2013). 
A high degree of management clout suggests that the writer is communicating with 
confidence and expertise.  In 2006, Itronics Inc. displayed high clout when they began their 
response to one of the SEC comments with the statement, "We note that you have requested 
disclosure required by Item 308(c) of Regulation S-B on our Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year 
ended December 31, 2006."  This introductory sentence reiterated what is being asked of them 
and then referenced the document in question, confidently acknowledging the request.9 
Low clout suggests a more tentative, humble, and anxious communication.  One indicator 
of lack of clout is limited use of first-person plural pronouns (i.e., we, us, our).  As an 
illustration, Webb Interactive Services, Inc. responded to a series of SEC comment letters by 
continually referring to themselves in the third person, i.e., “Webb believes it did not need to . . 
.”  Specifically, when asked why they did not believe they are subject to the Investment Act of 
1940, the company responded: “However, since March 19, 2003, Webb has owned less than a 
majority of Jabber’s outstanding securities, resulting in its Jabber securities being ‘investment 
securities’ within the meaning of the 1940 Act.”  This statement appears to exhibit low clout as 
management does not appear to exhibit confidence through ownership or shared sense of 
responsibility.10 
                                                          
9 The Clout measure from LIWC for this sentence was 99 on a scale of 0 (low Clout) to 100 (high Clout).   
10 The Clout measure from LIWC for this sentence was 26.6 on a scale of 0 (low Clout) to 100 (high Clout).   
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Management that exhibits low clout displays lack of confidence or rapport.  As a leader, 
management may lack the skills, confidence, or expertise necessary to effectively establish and 
oversee a strong control environment, increasing the risk of material misstatement. 
Management with greater clout may exhibit more confidence or provide greater expertise 
over the subject matter.  Management with high clout may exhibit leadership traits that guide 
employees with confidence by understanding and following regulation and promoting a strong 
control environment, with adherence to control activities and established company procedures.  
Thus, when a management exhibits high clout, the likelihood of a material misstatement may be 
reduced.  However, there is the risk that the influence of management may not be positive and 
altruistic but rather, may be used to manipulate or direct employees to engage in improper or 
illegal activities, increasing the likelihood of a material misstatement. 
Therefore, it is not clear how clout will impact the likelihood of a concurrent material 
misstatement.  Thus, I hypothesize in the null:  
H20: Concurrent financial reporting misstatements are not related to the extent of 
management’s clout.   
3.2.3 Authenticity 
The measure of authenticity, or truth-telling, is based on work performed and 
documented in Newman et al. (2003).  In this study, the authors consider that the language of 
authenticity versus deception, or lying, differ because telling lies requires creating a story about 
an experience or attitude that does not exist. Using multiple experiments where people have been 
induced to describe or explain something honestly or deceptively, the authors find that the 
combined use of first-person singular pronouns (I, me, my) and higher cognitive complexity 
through use of differentiation (but, except, without, exclude) predicts authenticity.  In contrast, 
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liars refer to themselves less often and use fewer first-person singular pronouns (I, me, my) likely 
to “dissociate” themselves with the lie (Newman et al. 2003).  Liars also tell less cognitively 
complex stories as shown through few differentiation and more motion words (walk, go, carry).  
By nature, the process of fabricating a story requires cognitive power, which leaves less 
cognitive function for distinguishing between what did happen and what did not happen through 
the use of differentiation.  
High authenticity is associated with a more honest, disclosing text.  For example, in 2005, 
EVCI Career Colleges Holding Corp. was prompted to provide detail about their refund policy 
and how it relates to the recognition of revenue and related receivables.  They responded by 
saying, “However, Interboro’s policy is not to bill TAP for a student, or record the related 
revenue and accounts receivable, unless the student has attended classes which collectively total 
12 or more semester hours at least twice.”  The statement clarified the guidelines of the policy 
and displays high cognitive complexity through disclosure of the minimum requirement to 
revenue recognition and the implication of differentiation that this revenue and accounts 
receivable is not capture in the accounts.11 
In contrast, low authenticity suggests a more guarded form of communication.  To 
illustrate this idea, Opexa Therapeutics, Inc. received a comment letter in 2007 asking them to 
provide information about significant assumptions and the valuation methodology considered in 
the purchase of Opexa Pharmaceuticals.  Management’s response included the note, “No 
purchase price was allocated to the fair value of purchased research and development projects, 
because there were no projects acquired from Opexa Pharmaceuticals which had value.”  The 
statement did not include any information around the process, considerations of alternative 
                                                          
11 The Authenticity measure from LIWC for this sentence was 92.70 on a scale of 0 (low Authenticity) to 100 (high 
Authenticity).   
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actions, or clarifications of assurances performed by management to verify their findings.12  
Thus, the response reflects a low degree of authenticity.  
I argue that the higher the degree of authenticity, the greater cognitive complexity shown 
through management’s consideration of alternative applications and policies, and the more likely 
the management would accurately reflect financial results.  Therefore, I predict the greater 
authenticity will result in fewer concurrent material misstatements and hypothesize the 
alternative: 
H3a: Concurrent financial reporting misstatements are negatively associated with the 
extent of management’s authenticity.  
3.2.4 Emotional Tone 
The measure of emotional tone is based on work performed and documented in Cohn et 
al. (2004).  The authors’ track indicators of psychological change in response to the September 
11, 2001 attacks through language use.  They calculate an emotional-positivity index as the 
difference between the LIWC scores for positive emotion words (i.e., happy, good, nice) and 
negative emotion words (i.e., angry, guilty) and find emotional-positivity declines significantly 
on September 11th and 12th, but returns to pre-September 11 levels within one week (Cohn et al. 
2004).  The summary variable emotional tone is derived from this measure and converted to 
percentiles based on standardized scores from large comparison samples (Pennebaker et al. 
2015).  A high measure of emotional tone is associated with a positive, upbeat style while low 
emotional tone reveals greater anxiety, sadness, or hostility.  A numerical score around 50 
suggests either a lack of emotionality or different levels of ambivalence.  
                                                          
12 The Authenticity measure from LIWC for this sentence was 1.00 on a scale of 0 (low Authenticity) to 100 (high 
Authenticity).   
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A manager that exhibits either excessively high or excessively low emotional tone may 
deviate from rationale judgment to a more emotionally driven interaction, increasing the 
likelihood of concurrent material misstatement.  In addition, positive emotional tone may be used 
to communicate optimism, as management might want to communicate when they report lower 
than expected earnings.  Henry (2008) identified that a positive tone positively affects the market 
reaction to earnings announcements, even after controlling for actual financial results, consistent 
with prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1986), which predicts that framing financial 
performance in positive terms will cause investors to think about the results in terms of increases 
relative to reference points (p. 393).  Indeed, the use of emotional tone may be a cover to distract 
attention away from the financial results or seek to draw attention away from material 
misstatement.   
In a similar vein, the language of a comment letter may contain greater positive 
emotional language in an attempt to draw the SEC staff’s attention away from material 
misstatement, judgment error, or insufficient analysis identified by the SEC in their initial 
communication to the company.  A manager who is emotionally ambivalent may be less likely to 
have a concurrent material misstatement.  The language may instead be operational and 
methodological in nature, and lacking in opinion or judgment.  For example, when asked to 
elaborate on the disclosure of their revenue recognition policy for advertising revenue in 2007, 
Quepasa Corporation responded, “We deliver our service in the following ways: 1) Frequency of 
the ad placement – the number of times the ad is viewed by a user visiting the site; 2) Clicks on 
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an ad – specific click on an ad by the internet user; 3) Impressions – the number of times the ad 
is displayed; and, 4) Cost per thousand views (CPM).”13 
The “inverted U-shaped” understanding of emotion described above makes it difficult to 
predict the direction of the emotional tone effect.  Due to this lack of clarity about whether 
higher emotional tone will result in a concurrent material misstatement, I hypothesize in the null:  
H40: Concurrent financial reporting misstatements are not related to the extent of 
management’s emotional tone. 
 In summary, I posit that four summary measures of managements’ attitudes and cognitive 
style may be related to the risk of concurrent material misstatement.  These four summary 
measures are posited to capture tone at the top, and concurrent material misstatement is posited 
to capture financial reporting quality.  These four constructs form the basis for my conceptual 
cause of the conceptual financial reporting quality effect.   
 
  
                                                          
13 The Emotional Tone measure from LIWC for this sentence was 57.83 on a scale of 0 (high negative Emotional 
Toney) to 100 (high positive Emotional Tone), where 50 suggests either a lack of emotionality or different levels of 
ambivalence. 
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Chapter 4: Data Description 
 This chapter describes my sample, empirical equations, and descriptive statistics.  The 
source of the data and the collection procedures used to arrive at the sample are described in 
Section 4.1.  Section 4.2 presents the criteria used in one-to-one size- and industry-matching.  
The regression model and the variables used in the empirical analysis to test the role of the 
linguistic markers are described in Section 4.3.  In Section 4.4, I discuss the rationale and use of 
factor analysis in the empirical tests.  In Section 4.5, I describe the use of bootstrapping, or 
resampling, and the empirical reasoning for employing this technique.  Finally, the descriptive 
statistics of the sample and the univariate findings are included in Section 4.6. 
4.1 Sample Identification  
I use the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) SEC Analytics Suite database to 
extract the population of small business issuers who received a comment letter after an SEC 
review on their public filings, which includes annual report Form 10-KSB or an amended version 
of Form 10-KSB, denoted Form 10-KSB/A.14  I require the fiscal year-end of the 10-KSB or 10-
KSB/A to fall within the three-year window from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2007 due to 
the timing of the public release of comment letters and responses to comment letters.15  I stop in 
late 2007 because the SEC changed the criteria and disclosure requirements of small business 
issuers effective February 4, 2008.  I limit my sample to exclude financial institutions given the 
differing regulations overseeing these institutions.   
                                                          
14 SEC Form 10-KSB, Annual Report for Small Businesses, is an abbreviated version of the standard SEC Form 10-
K filed annually by large public companies.  Under Regulation S-B, to qualify as a small business issuer, a company 
must have (1) less than $25 million in public float and (2) less than $25 million in annual revenue. 
15 The Securities and Exchange Commission released staff comment and filer response letters via only their online 
file storage website Electronic Data Gathering and Receiving (EDGAR) related to filings made after August 1, 2004 
or for fiscal years ended after August 1, 2004.  For fiscal years ended in August and September 2004, there were a 
limited number of company comment letters and responses made public likely to due to the combination of selected 
months and a lag associated with implementing the policy.  To maximize the sample size while obtaining the benefit 
of publicly release of the documents, I begin the three-year sample for fiscal years ended after October 1, 2004. 
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As documented in Table 1, Panel A, these search criteria yield 1,338 initial responses to 
SEC comment letters on forms 10-KSB and 10-KSB/A from 1,064 unique small business 
issuers.  Because an SEC comment letter can reference more than one fiscal year-end 10-KSB, I 
include the count of 1,346 issuer-fiscal years.  All analysis will be performed on an issuer-fiscal 
year basis.  Table 1, Panel B breaks out the responses to comment letters by the year of the fiscal 
year-end of the 10-KSB or 10-KSB/A under review. When a comment letter covers more than 
one year-end, the count is based on the earliest of the year-ends under review.  Finally, Table 1, 
Panel B includes a count by fiscal year-end of the 10-KSB or 10-KSB/A reviewed that were 
materially misstated and subsequently restated under a 4.02 GAAP misstatement.  
Next, I use Compustat database to obtain financial statement control variables for small 
business issuers who received a comment letter.  Each SEC comment letter references a specific 
10-KSB and/or 10-KSB/A fiscal year-end under review, which is denoted as year t.  All control 
variables are based on the prior year under review, denoted t-1.  Table 2 details the reduction of 
the population from 1,346 issuer-fiscal years to the remaining 558 issuer-fiscal years with 
complete information.16 
4.2 Matched Sample Selection 
 I examine the relationship between financial reporting quality and management’s 
attitudes and cognitive style using a matched sample test.  Following the one-to-one matching in 
Erickson et al. (2006), Efendi et al. (2007), and Armstrong et al. (2013), I match on the financial 
reporting quality measure of a subsequently announced material misstatement for the 10-KSB or 
                                                          
16 Based on review of the criteria identified by Compustat for inclusion in the database from the Standard & Poor’s 
Compustat® Xpressfeed manual “Understanding the Data,” companies are included if they constituent an index 
(e.g., S&P 500, TSE 300, etc.), trade on an exchanges (e.g., AMEX, NASDAQ, NYSE, etc.), and/or trade as an 
ADR or Sponsored ADR.  As small public issuers are less likely to fall into these categories, they are less likely to 
be included on Compustat. 
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10-KSB/A under review from the SEC, as referenced in the comment letter.  I require the 
restatement to be identified as a 4.02 misstatement on the company’s Form 8-K, which indicates 
the financial statements were restated because of a GAAP violation.  I match my identified 
sample of materially misstated filers under SEC review with filers of a similar size and in the 
same one-digit SIC industry code that received a comment letter, but who did not restate their 
annual reports because of a 4.02 misstatement.  I then test for the difference in managements’ 
attitudes and cognitive style using a logistic regression.  
4.3 Regression Model 
 I estimate the effect of attitudes and cognitive style for a matched sample using the 
following logistic regression: 
(1) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝜃 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀. 
The dependent variable MATMIS is an indicator variable equal to “1” for filers with a concurrent 
year material misstatement who subsequently restate their 10-KSB under SEC review after the 
initial 10-KSB filing.  I require the restatement to be identified as a 4.02 misstatement on Form 
8-K, which indicates the financial statements were restated because of a violation of GAAP; 
otherwise, MATMIS is set to 0.   
 LinguisticMarkers is a vector of the four summary linguistic marker variables, 
Authenticity, Clout, Emotional Tone, and Analytical Thinking, that capture the attitudes and 
cognitive style of management as extracted from management’s response to an SEC comment 
letter.  Authenticity captures managements’ honesty in written communication.  Truth-tellers are 
more likely to tell what they did and what they did not do, while liars tell less complex stories 
(Newman et al. 2003).  The degree of managements’ influence or power is measured by Clout 
which captures the extent of an author’s status, expertise, or leadership (Kacewicz et al. 2013).  
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Language can serve as a marker of status in a social hierarchy.  Emotional Tone captures the 
degree of emotion in the writing including negative or positive emotions in the correspondence.  
Analytical Thinking, or precise-thinking, is a style of thinking composed of heightened abstract 
thinking and cognitive complexity.  The higher the degree of analytical thinking, the more 
formal, precise thinking by the author (Pennebaker et al. 2014).  In contrast, the absence of 
analytical thinking is a dynamic or narrative language style.  I provide examples of calculation of 
Authenticity, Clout, Emotional Tone, and Analytical Thinking from comment letters in Appendix 
B. 
Controls is a vector of control variables identified in prior research as related to financial 
reporting quality.  These variables include firm age (FIRMAGE), past accounting performance 
(ROA), and capital intensity (CAPITAL).  Following work in Armstrong et al. (2013), I control 
for the amount of external financing (FINANCING), the value of any acquisition made 
(ACQNOTE), and interest coverage (INTERESTCOV) as they impact the risk of restatement 
(Burns and Kedia 2006, Efendi et al. 2007).  I include a control variable LARGEAUDITOR equal 
to “1” when a company is audited by an audit firm subject to an annual inspection review by the 
PCAOB, or “0” otherwise, based on research that finds larger audit firms provide higher quality 
auditors than smaller audit firms (Dopuch and Simunic 1980, DeAngelo 1981, Palmrose 1988, 
Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998, Khurana and Raman 2004, Behn, Choi, 
and Kang 2008).17  A higher quality audit would be more likely to find and correct GAAP 
financial statement errors during the audit and prior to a company filing its financial statements.  
Finally, given that comment letters can vary in the quantity of comments, I control for the 
                                                          
17 The following audit firms were identified as Large Auditors and subject to annual inspection by the PCAOB as 
each of these firms provides audit reports for more than 100 issuers per year: KPMG LLP; Ernst and Young LLP; 
Deloitte and Touche LLP; PriceWaterhouse Coopers LLP; Grant Thornton LLP; BDO Seidman LLP; Crowe Chizek 
& Company LLP; and McGladrey & Pullen LLP. 
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volume of information requested by the SEC in the comment letter by using as a proxy the 
digital size of the text of the comment letter sent from the SEC to management of the company, 
CLFileSize, measured in megabytes.  The larger the electronic file size, the longer the text of the 
comment letter and hence, the more issues and/or more complex concerns raised by the SEC and 
the greater the likelihood of a concurrent material misstatement in the financial statements.18 
4.4 Factor Analysis  
 In addition to considering the role of the four linguistic markers individually, I consider 
that linguistic markers as representative traits of managements’ attitudes and cognitive style may 
not stand-alone as individual, unique traits.  Rather, one identified trait may be more likely to 
occur in combination with one or more other traits.  To measure if the traits are interrelated or if 
one marker occurs more commonly (or less frequently) in tandem with another, I employ factor 
analysis.  Specifically, I use principal component analysis, following Jolliffe (2002).  The central 
idea of principal component analysis is to reduce the dimensionality of a data set in which there 
are a large number of interrelated variables, while retaining as much as possible of the variation 
present in the data set (Jolliffe 2002).  This reduction is achieved by transforming to a new set of 
variables, the principal components, which are uncorrelated, and which are ordered so that the 
first few retain most of the variation present in all of the original variables (Jolliffe 2002).  The 
first principal component of a set of variables is a weighted average of the variables in which the 
weights are chosen to make the composite variable reflect the maximum possible proportion of 
the total variation in the set (Kennedy 2008).  Additional principal components can be calculated 
(i.e., the second principal component is orthogonal to the first and uses weights designed to 
                                                          
18 For completeness, I also estimate Equation (1) including the number of words in management’s response letter to 
the SEC, WordCountMgt.  This variable did not add significant explanatory power and did not alter the findings 
document in Section 5.1 and thus, this variable is excluded from the analysis in Section 5.1 and on Table 7. 
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incorporate within it the maximum possible proportion of the remaining variation in the original 
variables), but the first principal component usually captures enough of the variation in the set to 
be an adequate representative of that set on its own (Kennedy 2008).   
I conduct a principal component analysis in SAS and extract the principal components 
that transform the original four linguistic markers into factors composed of the markers.  Then, I 
incorporate these factors into the regression in place of the original linguistic markers in the 
regression equation using the following equation: 
(2) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀. 
 
As with Equation (1), the dependent variable MATMIS is an indicator variable equal to “1” for 
filers with a concurrent year 4.02 misstatement who subsequently restate their 10-KSB under 
SEC review after the initial 10-KSB filing; otherwise, MATMIS is set to 0.  The vector Factors 
captures the effect of the factors composed of linguistic markers.  Controls is a vector of control 
variables identified in prior research and includes FIRMAGE, ROA, CAPITAL and other issuer-
specific variables as described in detail in Section 4.3.   
4.5 Bootstrapping Techniques 
 Given the limited sample size available for the materially misstated issuers, I employ 
bootstrapping, or resampling, techniques.  With a small sample size, there is the risk that the 
linguistic markers extracted from managements’ response letters are not normally distributed in 
the population.  Bootstrapping differs from the traditional parametric approach to inference in 
that it employs large numbers of repetitive computations to estimate the shape of a statistic’s 
sampling distribution, rather than strong distributional assumptions and analytic formulas 
(Mooney and Duval 1993).  The central idea is that it may sometimes be better to draw 
conclusions about the characteristics of a population strictly from the sample at hand, rather than 
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making perhaps unrealistic assumptions about that population (Mooney and Duval 1993).  
Bootstrapping involves “resampling” the data with replacement many, many times in order to 
generate an empirical estimate of the entire sampling distribution of a statistic.  I apply this 
method to the sample of 50 materially misstated issuers and 50 size- and industry-matched 
issuers that were not materially misstated.  I generate 1,000 iterations of the data, each with a 
sample size of 100, using simple random sampling with replacement.  I then re-estimate the 
regression in Equation (2) using these 1,000 samples.  Following the procedures in Patatoukas, 
Sloan, and Zha (2015), I estimate the regression for each of the iterations and save the estimated 
coefficients.  I arrive at a distribution for each coefficient in Equation (2).  The findings and 
inferences from these procedures are documented in Section 5.4. 
4.6 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results 
 The descriptive statistics for the full sample are provided in Table 3.  I winsorize all 
continuous independent variables at the 1 percent level to mitigate the effects of outliers.  The 
full sample of 558 small public issuers’ company-fiscal years reported a median (mean) SIZE in 
the year prior to the fiscal year under review of 2.29 (2.17), which represents a median (mean) 
market value of $9.9 million ($8.8 million).  The median (mean) book-to-market ratio is 0.07      
(-0.42) and the median (mean) leverage ratio is 0.64 (9.1).  Small business issuers have a median 
(mean) age of 9 years (11.3 years) and over half of the sample is composed of loss years with a 
median (mean) return on assets of -0.40 (-4.33).  In the sample of 558, only 70 issuer-fiscal years 
are audited by an annually inspected audit firm, referred to herein as LargeAuditors.   
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 Table 3 also compares characteristics of issuers with a concurrent material misstatement 
with issuers who did not have a material misstatement in their financial statements.19  The 
median SIZE of issuers with a material misstatement (1.99) is a market value of $7.32 million 
which is not significantly less than the median SIZE of non-misstated issuers (2.32) with a 
market value of $10.18 million.  The difference between the median (mean) age of materially 
misstated issuers is significant with materially misstated issuers 2.00 (2.27) years younger than 
non-misstated issuers.  
The median book-to-market ratio (BM), leverage, and return on assets (ROA) are similar 
between the two sets of issuers.  The mean leverage and return on assets is also consistent 
between the issuers, but the mean book-to-market ratio is statistically different with materially 
misstated issuers compose of significantly lower BM values (-2.06) compared to non-misstated 
issuers (-0.26).  Upon further review, the small number (N=50) of the materially misstated 
issuers has a statistically significant lower BM value because of the extreme negative measure of 
a handful of the selections.  Specifically, two of the selection have a BM of -22.47, while two of 
the selections have a BM of -22.25.  Consequently, these four selections appear to drive the large 
negative BM values.  If these extreme values are removed from the sample, the BM of materially 
misstated issuers becomes -0.29 and is not statistically different from non-misstated issuers (-
0.26).  Based on the total sample size of N=558, the materially misstated issuers are younger and 
smaller with lower book-to-market values.  The univariate findings appear sensitive to the small 
sample size of N=50 materially misstated issuers compared to N=508 non-misstated issuers.  
However, the univariate findings indicating materially misstated issuers are younger and smaller 
                                                          
19 To be identified as a “materially misstated issuer,” the small business issuer must have classified the material 
misstatement as a 4.02 GAAP misstatement on Form 8-K filed on the SEC’s public online file storage website 
Electronic Data Gathering and Receiving (EDGAR).  
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with lower book-to-market values are consistent with findings on similar analysis investigating 
financial reporting quality for larger, public corporations. 
 To address the sensitivity of the smaller sample of materially misstated issuers, I perform 
one-to-one matching on the population of 50 materially misstated issuers to arrive a sample to 
test with a multivariate equation.  I create a matched sample by generating size-and-industry 
matched pairs.  I match the sample of 50 materially misstated issuers under SEC review with 
filers of a similar size and in the same one-digit SIC industry code who received a comment 
letter, but who did not restate their annual reports because of a 4.02 misstatement.  Table 4 
provides the descriptive statistics for the size- and industry-matched sample.  By construction, 
there is no significant difference between the size of materially misstated issuers and the non-
misstated issuers.  In addition, contrary to the univariate findings of the full sample of N=588 in 
Table 3, there are no significant differences on the book-to-market ratio, leverage, firm age, 
return on assets, or total assets between the materially misstated issuers and the non-misstated 
issuers.  The univariate findings for the size- and industry-matched sample in Table 4 indicate 
that all differences between the two groups have been “matched out.”  
 Table 5 is the correlation table for the independent and control variables for the size- and 
industry-matched sample pairs composed of 100 observations.  Analytical Thinking is negatively 
correlated with both Clout and Authenticity.  This negative correlation indicates that management 
that engages in greater analytical thinking does not display strong characteristics of clout or 
authenticity in the written text.  Not surprisingly, SIZE is positively correlated with Total Assets.  
Leverage is negatively correlated with an issuer SIZE, book-to-market ratio (BM), and return on 
assets (ROA) indicating that issuers are highly levered are smaller in size and less profitable.  
Given the strong correlation between SIZE and Total Assets as well as Leverage, SIZE, book-to-
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market ratio (BM), and return on assets (ROA), I include SIZE and ROA as control variables in 
the regression and exclude Leverage and BM.20 
 Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics for the four summary linguistic marker 
variables, Authenticity, Clout, Emotional Tone, and Analytical Thinking, that capture the attitudes 
and cognitive style of management for the sample of 50 materially misstated issuers and 50 size- 
and industry-matched issuers that were not materially misstated.  The four summary variables 
were extracted from managements’ responses to an SEC comment letter using LIWC.  The 
univariate statistics indicate that management of materially misstated issuers respond to SEC 
staff with a higher level of Analytical Thinking.  Management of materially misstated issuers 
appear to exhibit less Clout, or status, when corresponding with SEC staff.  The degree of 
Authenticity and Emotional Tone is not statistically different between management of materially 
misstatement issuers and issuers that did not have a material misstatement. 
 Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics for the volume of text measured as the count of 
the number of words written by management, WordCountMgt, for the sample of 50 materially 
misstated issuers and 50 size- and industry-matched issuers that were not materially misstated.  
The word count was extracted from managements’ responses to an SEC comment letter using 
LIWC.  The univariate statistic indicate that management of materially misstated issuers did not 
write statistically significant longer responses than management of issuers that were not 
misstated.   
 Lastly, Table 6 provides the descriptive statistics for the number of words included in the 
initial, or first, letter written by the SEC staff and sent to management, WordCountSEC, for the 
sample of 50 materially misstated issuers and 50 size- and industry-matched issuers that were not 
                                                          
20 In untabulated results, the empirical findings and inferences described in Chapter 5 hold when Leverage and BM 
are included in the regression. 
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materially misstated.  The word count was extracted from an analysis of the initial letter written 
by the SEC staff using LIWC.  The univariate statistics indicate that the SEC did write 
significantly more or significantly less information to management of materially misstated 
issuers compared to management of issuers that were not misstatement.   
 In summary, the procedures to collect a sample of small public issuers identified 50 
materially misstated issuers.  One-to-one matching using size- and industry-matching generated 
an additional 50 selections.  Based on results compiled in Table 4, the matched-sample is 
composed of issuers of similar size, age, leverage, ROA, and BM.  The initial univariate findings 
indicate managements’ attitudes and cognitive style affects financial reporting quality.  In the 
next chapter, I report the results of multivariate regressions using the 50 matched-sample pairs to 
identify and conclude on the role of managements’ attitudes and cognitive style on financial 
reporting quality.   
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Chapter 5: Results & Analysis 
 This chapter describes the results of the empirical tests and robustness tests.  Section 5.1 
documents the results of the multivariate regression of material misstatements on the individual 
and collective linguistic markers of managements’ attitude and cognitive style.  Section 5.2 
presents the findings of principal component analysis to identify two factors and the empirical 
results of a regression of concurrent material misstatements on the identified factors.  Section 5.3 
documents the change in predicted response output from regression equations before and after 
considering the two factors composed of linguistic markers on material misstatements.  The 
results of bootstrapping the regression equation that included the identified factors are described 
in Section 5.4.  The change in predicted responses before considering the factors and after 
bootstrapping the regression equation with the factors is shown in Section 5.5.  Section 5.6 
documents the results of robustness tests while Section 5.7 provides a discussion of overall 
findings of this dissertation. 
5.1 Matched Sample Regression Results 
 Table 7 provides results for the regression models testing whether managements’ 
attitudes and cognitive style differ between materially misstated issuers who subsequently 
restated their financial statements and non-misstated issuers.  Using the sample of 50 responses 
with concurrent misstatements that I match to issuers without a material misstatement using size- 
and industry-pair matching, I estimate Equation (1): 
(1) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝜃 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀. 
 In column 1, I estimate the logistic regression without considering managements’ attitudes and 
cognitive style variables and include only control variables that have been shown to affect the 
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likelihood of a material misstatement.  While the control variables not are statistically 
significant, the pseudo R-squared of 7.0% indicates they provide some explanatory power.  
In column 2, I estimate the regression model using only Analytical Thinking in order to 
test my first hypothesis which addresses the relationship between analytical thinking and 
material misstatement.  My results indicate, contrary to my null hypothesis one, the coefficient 
on Analytical Thinking is positive and significant at the 5% level. This result indicates that a 
greater degree of precise, analytical thinking by management increases the likelihood of a 
material misstatement.  This finding implies that management with a limited focus on one object 
or goal may overlook the broader effect of judgments, increasing the risk of material 
misstatement.  
In column 3, I estimate the regression model including only Clout in order to test my 
second hypothesis, which investigates the role of confidence or expertise on the likelihood of 
material misstatement.  I find a statistically significant negative coefficient on the linguistic 
marker for Clout, supporting the idea that management with high Clout exhibits confidence by 
understanding and following regulation and promoting a strong control environment.  The 
greater clout – that is, the more expertise, leadership, and influence exhibited by management –
the lower the likelihood of a concurrent material misstatement.  Thus, a manager’s confidence 
and expertise does appear to influence financial reporting quality.  
In column 4, I investigate the role of Authenticity individually to test the third hypothesis 
that concurrent misstatements are negatively associated with the extent of management’s 
authenticity.  I fail to find support for the third hypothesis.  Rather, the results indicate that 
management’s authenticity is unrelated to the likelihood of material misstatement.  The degree of 
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management’s forthcoming, authentic communication does not appear to impact financial 
reporting quality.  
In column 5, I estimate the regression model including only Emotional Tone to test the 
fourth hypothesis of the association between Emotional Tone and concurrent material 
misstatement.  The results indicate that Emotional Tone is not statistically significant at the 10% 
level which is consistent with the null form of my fourth hypothesis.  That is, the use of positive 
or negative emotion in the text does not appear to be related to financial reporting quality.21 
Finally, in column 6, I estimate the regression model with all four linguistic markers of 
managements’ attitude and cognitive style, Analytical Thinking, Clout, Authenticity, and 
Emotional Tone.  Contrary to the findings of the individual analysis performed in columns 2 – 5, 
the coefficients on Analytical Thinking and Clout are no longer statistically significant.  Based on 
a review of the correlation table included at Table 5, the linguistic markers are negatively 
correlated at statistical significant of 1% and including them in the same regression is likely 
muting the individual effects and causing multicollinearity in the regression.  Empirical tests that 
investigate how linguistic markers interact with one another, and form factors that may 
significantly affect financial reporting quality, are explored in Section 5.2. 
5.2 Results of Factor Analysis  
 In addition to considering the role of the four linguistic markers individually, I consider 
that linguistic markers as representative traits of managements’ attitudes and cognitive style may 
not stand-along as individual, unique traits.  Rather, one identified trait may be more likely to 
                                                          
21 Recall that Emotional Tone is recorded on scale from 0 to 100, with a measure of 0 capturing negative emotional 
tone, 50 suggesting a lack of emotionality or ambivalence, and 100 representing a high positive, upbeat style.  As an 
alternative test, I transformed this measure to a 0 to 50 scale, with 0 reflecting lack of emotionality and 50 
representing a high degree of emotion, regardless of the nature (positive or negative) of the emotion.  In untabulated 
results, I find this variable is not statistically significant either individually or collectively with additional linguistic 
markers.  Refer to Section 5.7 for additional discussion around Emotional Tone. 
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occur in combination with one or more traits.  Thus, to measure if traits are interrelated or if one 
marker occurs more commonly in tandem with another, I employ factor analysis using principal 
component analysis, as described in Section 4.4.  In this case, a “factor” is a set of observed 
variables that have similar response patterns because they are associated with a variable that is 
not directly measured.  The results from principal component analysis are documented in Table 
8.  Principal component analysis yields two factors from the four individual traits of 
managements’ attitudes and cognitive style. 
Factor 1 is composed of negative Analytical Thinking and (positive) Clout.  A lower level 
of Analytical Thinking is composed of a personal, narrative style of writing with low cognitive 
complexity.  Greater Clout is associated with more status, power, or expertise.  Consequently, 
the factor appears to capture a narrative, personal style with the manager reflecting confidence 
and expertise. 
Factor 2 is composed of negative Authenticity, indicating a resistant, guarded form of 
communication and information exchange.  Greater Emotional Tone is associated with a positive, 
upbeat style.  This factor indicates management may be less forthcoming, but the language is 
positive in nature.   
I estimate the multivariate regression Equation (2) as described in Section 4.4: 
(2) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀. 
I include the two factors, noted above, to test the role of the composite variables on financial 
reporting quality.  The results are included in Table 9.  Similar to Table 7, column 1 is the 
logistic regression without any factors and includes only control variables shown to affect the 
likelihood of a material misstatement. 
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In column 2, I include only Factor1 that capture a narrative, personal style and a 
confident manager.  The coefficient on Factor1 is negative and statistically significant, implying 
that a narrative style from a confident manager decreases the likelihood of material misstatement.  
This finding is consistent with the finding of the individual components of Analytical Thinking 
and Clout shown in Table 7.  With the low degree of Analytical Thinking, the manager is not 
focused on one specific goal or subject, but considers broader implications of their judgments or 
decisions, which I find decreases the likelihood a concurrent misstatement.  The higher degree of 
Clout exhibited by the manager captures more confidence and expertise, which again affects the 
financial reporting quality by decreasing the likelihood of a concurrent material misstatement. 
In column 3, I include only Factor2 and note that the factor is not statistically significant.  
Management’s restrained communication yet positive emotion does not appear to affect financial 
reporting quality.  This is also consistent with the individual findings for Authenticity and 
Emotional Tone in Table 7.   
In column 4, I include both Factor1 and Factor2.  Factor1 continues to hold as 
statistically significant and negative.  The role of lower Analytical Thinking and greater Clout 
decreases the likelihood of a material misstatement even when controlling for restrained yet 
positive communication from management.22   
5.3 Predicted Response Analysis for Regression with Factors 
The sample is composed of 50 responses with concurrent misstatements that I match to 
issuers without a material misstatement using one-to-one size- and industry-pair matching.  
Using the coefficients from estimating Equation (2), as documented in Table 9, I investigate the 
                                                          
22 Note that Factor1 and Factor2 are orthogonal by design.  Thus, the coefficients on Factor1 and Factor2 in 
Column 4 are the same as the individual effect documented in Column 2 and Column 3, respectively. 
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change in the predicted response (𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ ) output from a regression equation before and after 
considering the two factors composed of linguistic markers on material misstatements.   
In Table 10, Panel A, I document the predicted outcome response, 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ , using the 
estimated coefficients from a logistic regression that includes only control variables, as 
documented in column 1 of Table 9.  The predicted outcome responses fall into one of four 
categories, depicted in a 2 x 2 matrix, based on (i) the predicted outcome response of 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0 or 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1 and (ii) the actual outcome from the sample of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 or 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1.   
If an observation has a predicted outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1, but the actual 
outcome of the observation was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0, the classification error is considered to be a Type 
1 classification error (documented in the bottom left corner of the matrix).  The controls-only 
regression equation incorrectly predicted that the observation generated a material misstatement 
but in actuality, the observation was not material misstatement.  Of the 50 observations classified 
as 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 in the sample, 19 observations were improperly predicted with an outcome 
response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1, generating a Type 1 error classification of 38%.  
If an observation has a predicted outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0, but the actual 
outcome of the observation was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1, the classification error is considered to be a Type 
2 classification error (documented in top right corner of the matrix).  The controls-only 
regression equation incorrectly predicted that the observation would not be materially misstated 
but in actuality, the observation was materially misstated.  Of the 50 observations classified as 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1 in the sample, 20 observations were improperly predicted with an outcome 
response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0, generating a Type 2 error classification of 40%. 
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The remaining observations fall into one of two categories where the predicted outcome 
response matched the response from the sample.  In the first category, the predicted outcome 
response was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0 for observations where 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0, which occurred in 31 out of 
the 50 observations.  In the second category, the predicted outcome response was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1 
for observations where 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1.  This outcome occurred in 30 out of 50 observation.  
Thus, the model correctly predicted a combined 61% of the sample.   
To document how the addition of the two identified factors changes the accuracy of the 
predicted response, I then estimate the predicted response (𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ ) output from a regression 
equation after considering the two factors composed of linguistic markers.  In Table 10, Panel B, 
I document the predicted outcome response, 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ , using the estimated coefficients from a 
logistic regression that includes the factors and control variables, as documented in column 4 of 
Table 9.  The predicted outcome responses fall into one of four categories, depicted in a 2 x 2 
matrix, based on (i) the predicted outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0 or 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1 and (ii) 
the actual outcome from the sample of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 or 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1.   
Following the classification model described above for Table 10, Panel A, I find for the 
50 observations classified as 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 in the sample, 18 observations were erroneously 
predicted with an outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1, generating a Type 1 error classification of 
36%.  As documented in Table 10, Panel C, compared to the control-only regression in Panel A, 
the predicted responses from a regression equation that includes factors composed of linguistic 
markers improves the accuracy of the predictive response by reducing the Type 1 classification 
error rates by 5%. 
For the 50 observations classified as 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1 in the sample, 15 observations were 
erroneously predicted with an outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0, generating a Type 2 error 
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classification of 30%.  As documented in Table 10, Panel C, compared to the control-only 
regression in Panel A, the predicted responses from a regression equation that includes factors 
composed of linguistic markers improves the accuracy of the predictive response by reducing the 
Type 2 classification error rates by 25%. 
For the remaining observations that were accurately predicted using the estimated 
coefficients from a logistic regression that includes the factors and control variables, the 
predicted outcome response was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0 for observations where 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 in 32 out 
of 50 of the observations.  The predicted outcome response was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1 for observations 
where 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1 for 35 out of 50 observations.  Thus, this model correctly predicted a 
combined 67% of the sample.  As documented in Table 10, Panel C, compared to the control-
only regression in Panel A, the predicted responses from a regression equation that includes 
factors composed of linguistic markers improved the overall accuracy of the predictive response 
by 10%.  
5.4 Bootstrapping Results for Factor Analysis Regression 
Given the limited sample size available for the materially misstated issuers, I employ 
bootstrapping, or resampling, techniques, described in Section 4.5.  Using the complete sample 
of size- and industry-matched observations (N=100), I bootstrapped this sample using a simple 
random sampling with replacement to create 1,000 samples composed of 100 observations.   
Using these 1,000 samples, I re-estimated Equation (2) for 1,000 iterations: 
(2) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀. 
For each iteration, I save the estimated coefficients and arrive a distribution of the coefficients 
for a sample of 1,000.  The results are documented in Table 11.  The mean values of the 
coefficients are used in a regression for the predictive analysis described below in Section 5.5.  
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5.5 Predicted Response Analysis for the Bootstrapped Sample 
The sample is composed of 50 responses with concurrent misstatements that I match to 
issuers without a material misstatement using one-to-one size- and industry-pair matching.  I 
investigate the change in the predicted response (𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ ) output from a regression equation 
with only control variables where the coefficients are from estimating Equation (2) on the 
original sample (N=100) and a regression that includes two identified factors composed of 
linguistic markers, with estimated coefficient generated from the 1,000 iterations of bootstrapped 
samples of 100 observations. 
In Table 12, Panel A, I document the predicted outcome response, 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ , using the 
estimated coefficients from a logistic regression that includes only control variables, as 
documented in column 1 of Table 9.  The predicted outcome responses fall into one of four 
categories, depicted in a 2 x 2 matrix, based on (i) the predicted outcome response of 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0 or 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1 and (ii) the actual outcome from the sample of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 or 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1.   
If an observation has a predicted outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1, but the actual 
outcome of the observation was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0, the classification error is considered to be a Type 
1 classification error (documented in the bottom left corner of the matrix).  The controls-only 
regression equation erroneously predicted that the observation generated a material misstatement 
when the observation was not material misstatement.  Of the 50 observations classified as 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 in the sample, 19 observations were improperly predicted with an outcome 
response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1, generating a Type 1 error classification of 38%.  
If an observation has a predicted outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0, but the actual 
outcome of the observation was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1, the classification error is considered to be a Type 
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2 classification error (documented in top right corner of the matrix).  The controls-only 
regression equation erroneously predicted that the observation would not be materially misstated 
but in actuality, the observation was materially misstated.  Of the 50 observations classified as 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1 in the sample, 20 observations were improperly predicted with an outcome 
response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0, generating a Type 2 error classification of 40%. 
The remaining observations fall into one of two categories where the LIWC model 
correctly predicts the outcomes (i.e., the predicted outcome response matches the actual response 
value from the sample.)  In the first category, the predicted outcome response was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0 
for observations where 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0.  This occurred in 31 out of the 50 observations.  In the 
second category, the predicted outcome response was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1 for observations where 
𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1.  This outcome occurred in 30 out of 50 observation.  Thus, the model correctly 
predicted a combined 61% of the sample.   
To document how the addition of the two identified factors changes the accuracy of the 
predicted response, I then estimate the predicted response (𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ ) output from a regression 
that includes two identified factors composed of linguistic markers.  In Table 12, Panel B, I 
document the predicted outcome response, 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ , using the estimated coefficients from a 
logistic regression that includes the factors and control variables, generated from the 1,000 
iterations of bootstrapped samples of 100 observations, as documented in Mean column of Table 
11.  The predicted outcome responses fall into one of four categories, depicted in a 2 x 2 matrix, 
based on (i) the predicted outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0 or 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1 and (ii) the actual 
outcome from the sample of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 or 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1.   
Following the classification model described above for Table 10, Panel A, I find for the 
50 observations classified as 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 in the sample, 12 observations were erroneously 
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predicted with an outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1, generating a Type 1 error classification of 
24%.  As documented in Table 12, Panel C, compared to the control-only regression in Panel A, 
the predicted responses from a regression equation based on bootstrapped sample that includes 
factors composed of linguistic markers improves the accuracy of the predictive response by 
reducing the Type 1 classification error rates by 37%. 
For the 50 observations classified as 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1 in the sample, 22 observations were 
erroneously predicted with an outcome response of 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0, generating a Type 2 error 
classification of 44%.  As documented in Table 12, Panel C, compared to the control-only 
regression in Panel A, the predicted responses from a regression equation based on bootstrapped 
samples that includes factors composed of linguistic markers reduces the accuracy of  the 
predictive response by increasing the Type 2 classification error rates by 10%. 
For the remaining observations that were correctly predicted using the estimated 
coefficients from a logistic regression that includes the factors and control variables, the 
predicted outcome response was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 0 for observations where 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 0 in 38 out 
of 50 of the observations.  The predicted outcome response was 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆̂ = 1 for observations 
where 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆 = 1 for 28 out of 50 observations.  Thus, this model correctly predicted a 
combined 66% of the sample.  As documented in Table 12, Panel C, compared to the control-
only regression in Panel A, the predicted responses from a regression equation that includes 
factors composed of linguistic markers improved the overall accuracy of the predictive response 
by 8%.  
While the predictive findings of bootstrapping the sample for this regression are mixed 
with a 37% reduction in Type 1 errors and a 10% increase in Type 2 errors, the overall 8% 
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improvement in the accuracy of prediction supports the finding managements’ attitudes and 
cognitive styles in the control environment do play a role in affecting financial reporting quality. 
5.6 Robustness and Additional Analyses 
 To partially assess possible effects of control and reliability factors considered by other 
language and accounting researchers, this section describes three robustness tests.  First, I test the 
sensitivity of the above analysis to the volume of text, or the number of words, in management’s 
response letter by constraining the sample to include only letters with at least 500 words.  
Second, I consider the level of independence of the Board of Directors by controlling for “CEO 
duality,” defined as entities whose CEO is also Chair of the Board of Directors.  Third, I remove 
any role the issuance of an SEC comment letter may have played in bringing to management’s 
attention the particular material misstatement. 
5.6.1 Sensitivity to the Volume of Text in Response Letter 
 The LIWC text analysis software calculates the percentage of words falling into a 
specific category by counting the occurrence of a word that falls into the category, summing all 
such occurrences, and dividing by the total number of words in the text.  The percentage of 
words in specific categories becomes the basis of the four summary variables – Analytical 
Thinking, Clout, Authenticity, and Emotional Tone (Pennebaker et al. 2014, Kacewicz et al. 
2013, Newman et al. 2013, and Cohn et al. 2004, respectively).  Each of the summary variables 
was derived from previously published findings and converted to percentiles based on 
standardized scores from large comparison samples (Pennebaker et al. 2015).  Consequently, the 
total number of words used in the analyzed text may possibly explain my findings.  Specifically, 
response letters with a limited numbers of words will be more sensitive to the dictionary words 
that fall into a specific category underlying a summary variable because of the “small base” 
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provided by the total word count denominator.  The scores for the summary variables for the 
sample will potentially be stronger, thereby biasing my tests.  
 To address the potential bias in measuring the linguistic markers, I limit the sample to 
size- and industry- matched pairs where both the response letters of the materially misstated 
issuer and the matched non-materially misstated issuer had at least 500 words.23  This revised 
sample is composed of 38 small business issuers with a concurrent material misstatement in the 
fiscal year under review and 38 size- and industry-matched selections of small business issuers 
that are not materially misstated.  I re-estimate Equation (1) for this revised sample: 
(1) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝜃 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀. 
Table 13 reports the results of re-estimating Equation (1) for issuer pairs with at least 500 words 
in management’s response letter to the SEC staff.  Equation (1) tests whether management’s 
attitude and cognitive style affects the likelihood of a concurrent material misstatement 
compared to companies that did not have a material misstatement.   
Results are somewhat consistent with those of the full sample reported in Table 7.  
Specifically, in the second column of Table 13, the coefficient on Analytical Thinking of 0.22 is 
similar to the coefficient of 0.25 reported in the full sample.  The change in significance from the 
5% level to the 10% level on Table 13 is likely due to the loss of power associated with the 
smaller sample size of N of 38 matched pairs.  Consistent with the findings in Section 5.1 and 
Table 7, the positive and significant coefficient on Analytical Thinking suggests that precise, 
                                                          
23 I reviewed the word counts of response letters from management of materially misstated issuers, and removed all 
materially misstated issuers with less than 500 words along with their matched non-misstated issuer regardless of 
word count. Then, I reviewed the word counts of response letters from all matched non-misstated issuers, and 
removed all non-misstated issuers with less than 500 words along with their paired materially misstated issuer 
regardless of word count.  Thus, each of the response letters in the remaining sample was composed of at least 500 
words. 
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analytical thinking by management increases the likelihood of a material misstatement and this is 
robust to excluding the more sensitive selections with fewer than 500 words.  
Contrary to the previously reported findings in Section 5.1 and Table 7, the coefficient on 
Clout in column 3 of Table 13 is approximately unchanged and still negative but is no longer 
statistically significant.  The variable, Clout, which is intended to captures the role of expertise, 
leadership, and influence, is not robust to this smaller sample.  One possible implication of this 
finding is that a subset of letters with compactly worded responses are driving the findings in the 
full sample (N=100) documented in Table 7.  In reviewing the average values of Clout for the 
revised sample, the mean values for non-misstated issuers falls from 74.90 for the original 
sample (N=50) to 71.98 for N=38 sample.  The value of Clout for materially misstated issuers 
also decreases but to a lesser extent, going from 69.35 with the original sample to 68.75 in the 
sample of 38.   
Consistent with the findings on the full sample in Table 7, the degree of Authenticity and 
Emotional Tone are still not statistically significant.  The degree of forthcoming, authentic 
communication and the use of positive and negative emotion does not appear to be related to 
financial reporting quality.  In addition, when the regression is estimated with all four summary 
variables collectively, no individual measure of attitude and cognitive style is statistically 
significant.  These finds are compiled in column 6 of Table 13 and are consistent with the 
findings document on Table 7, column 6 using the full sample.24 
 
 
                                                          
24 The same procedures described in Section 5.6.1 were performed after limiting the sample to response letters with 
at least 1,000 words.  The sample was composed of 19 matched sample pairs, or N=38.  The validity of the model fit 
was questionable as there was quasi-separation of the data points, making it impossible to identify inferences from 
this small sample. 
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5.6.2 Sensitivity to “CEO Duality” as a Potential Internal Control Weakness 
As documented in Section 2.2, research has investigated the role of the Board of 
Directors in establishing and maintaining a strong control environment.  In addition, research on 
comment letters has identified that weaknesses in governance are positively associated with the 
receipt of a comment letter (Cassell et al. 2013).  I test the sensitivity of my findings to this 
factor by including a variable to control for the shared responsibility and increased control when 
the position of the Chairman of the Board of Directors is held by the CEO, commonly referred to 
as CEO duality as a possible indicator of a weak control environment.  I estimate Equation (1) by 
including an indicator variable CEODUALITY equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors or 0 otherwise.   
 In untabulated analyses, I find results consistent with those of the full sample reported in 
Table 7 after controlling for the increased governance risk.  The coefficient on CEODUALITY  is 
not significant across any of the estimations and the coefficients are very close and the inferences 
are maintained.  In some cases, the linguistic markers become more statistically significant.  The 
coefficient on Analytical Thinking remains positive and statistically significant at 0.26 
(p=0.0289).  The coefficient on Clout is still negative and statistically significant at -0.46 
(p=0.0218).  The degree of Authenticity and Emotional Tone are still not statistically significant.  
The finding and inferences from Section 5.1 appear robust to CEO duality. 
5.6.3 Sensitivity to SEC Comment Letter Prompting Misstatement 
The SEC can issue a comment letter at any point after the company publicly files their 
financial reports with the SEC.  At any time after filing, a company may identify a material 
misstatement and realize they need to restate their financial statements.  As the SEC comment 
letters investigate the disclosures and financial reporting provided by the company, and as 
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management is required to address the points raised by the SEC, some of the materially 
misstatements may have been discovered or a decision made to disclose was prompted by the 
SEC comment letter.  I attempt to remove any consideration of the role the issuance of an SEC 
comment letter would have played in focusing attention on the material misstatement.   
To do this, I limit the sample to material misstatement companies (and their size- and 
industry-matched selection) whose Form 8-K announcement of a 4.02 material misstatement 
occurred before the receipt of the SEC comment letter or where the topic of the 4.02 restatement 
was not cited in the SEC correspondence.   
I review the initial correspondence written by the SEC staff to top management to 
identify all of the topics under investigation.  Then, I review the Form 8-K (and any subsequent 
Form 8-K/A) that announced the 4.02 GAAP misstatement to identify the reason for the 
restatement.  If management mentions a topic in the Form 8-K that is identified in the SEC 
comment letter, the selection is deemed to be prompted by the SEC review.  Often, the text in the 
Form 8-K specifically cites the SEC staff comment letter as the source of the identification of the 
material misstatement.  If no explanation is provided in the Form 8-K or the topic is not 
mentioned, I obtain the 10KSB/A to determine if management makes reference to the reason for 
the amended filing.  If management mentions a topic in the 10KSB/A that is identified in the 
SEC comment letter, the selection is deemed to be prompted by the SEC review.   
Given that the SEC staff comment letters are broad in scope and I employ a very 
conservative test of the role of the SEC, 35 out of 50 of the materially misstatement issuers 
identify the same topic or cite the SEC staff comment letter in their Form 8-K announcement.  
Thus, the revised sample is composed of 15 small business issuers with a concurrent material 
misstatement in the fiscal year under review and 15 size- and industry-matched selections of 
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small business issuers that are not materially misstated.  I re-estimate Equation (1) for this 
revised sample: 
(1) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝜃 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀. 
In untabulated results, I find that I lose significance on both Analytical Thinking and 
Clout. The coefficient on Analytical Thinking increases from 0.25 to 0.39 and the p-value 
increases but only to 0.1073 (0.0536 one-tailed) even though the sample is only composed of 15 
materially misstated firms.  In addition, the coefficient on Clout changes to -0.0211 with a p-
value of 0.6091.  The coefficients on the degree of Authenticity and Emotional Tone remain 
statistically insignificant.  While this finding appears to call into question inferences proposed 
earlier in the paper, it is important to consider that with a sample size of N of 15 matched pairs, 
there is a significant loss of power in the test, thereby limiting my ability to provide firm 
conclusions. 
5.7 Discussion of Overall Findings 
The results for the multivariate regressions testing the association between managements' 
attitudes and cognitive style and financial reporting quality documented in Section 5.1 and in 
Table 7 show some management traits appear likely to affect the probability of a material 
misstatement.  I find Analytical Thinking is positively related to the likelihood of a concurrent 
material misstatement, implying higher Analytical Thinking and a distinct focus on one object or 
goal may cause management to overlook the broader implication of their decisions or judgments.  
I also find that the degree of Clout exhibited by management plays a significant role on the 
likelihood of material misstatement.  Specifically, the greater the degree of Clout exhibited by 
management, the lower the likelihood of a concurrent material misstatement.  This finding 
indicates that the greater the expertise, leadership, or influence that management displays, which 
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are consistent with strong tone at the top, the lower the likelihood of a material misstatement and 
the higher the financial reporting quality. 
Contrary to my predictions, I do not find any significant results for the role of 
Authenticity on financial reporting quality.  There are two possible reasons for this.  First, one 
component of the measure of Authenticity is the consideration of the use of first-person 
pronouns, including me, my, and I.  Specifically, liars used first-person pronouns at a lower rate 
than truth-tellers (Newman et al. 2003).  However, the language of business and the nature of the 
questions asked by the SEC in their comment letters focus on inconsistencies in the company’s 
filed reporting documents.  Hence, there is likely a limited reason to respond using “I” or to 
engage in self-reflection and the use of first-person pronouns is infrequent, as management tends 
to refer to the actions of the company by addressing the company by name or using the 
terminology “the company.”25  As a result, a significant measurement component of Authenticity 
may not emerge in these company response letters.  This limits the ability of the measure to 
accurately capture and reflect the extent of truth-telling in business language of this nature and 
hence, likely to some degree, the inferences and effect of truth-telling on financial reporting 
quality in this study.  Second, the measure of Authenticity is a “sticky” measure, sensitive to use 
and often difficult to interpret.  Authentic and deceptive measures are the most criticized 
measures given their sensitivity despite studies that find the measures are effective at capturing 
truth telling and liars in specific settings. 
As to emotional tone, I find the measure of Emotional Tone does not have a statistically 
significant effect on financial reporting quality.  Recall that emotional tone aims to capture the 
                                                          
25 Of the 100 comment letters analyzed in this study, 67 letters recorded the use of the first-person singular pronouns 
me, my, and I with a mean of 0.16 percent of the total written words from the comment letters, which is 3.24 uses in 
the mean size letter of 2,028 words.   
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degree of positive and negative emotion in the written text.  There are two possible explanations 
for finding that management's emotional tone is not affecting the likelihood of a concurrent 
material misstatement.  First, business language traditionally is written with a formal tone, 
lacking declaration of personal expression of contentment or sadness.  As the language analyzed 
in this study is extracted from a professional, business setting, there is the risk that the 
communications inherently do not contain positive or negative emotion.  In addition, it is 
important to note that, because the correspondence in this study is composed of language written 
between management and a regulator, it is likely management would refrain from speaking 
disparagingly to the SEC of out of respect or for fear of retribution.  Therefore, a majority of the 
managements’ responses would likely include limited, if any, emotional tone relative to an 
opinion piece or personal declaration.  Consequently, the text may contain fewer words that 
Emotional Tone, reflecting increased sensitivity of the measure and an increased risk of 
measurement error.  Second, the words of the LIWC dictionary may not contain words that 
reflect or capture negative or positive emotional in business and accounting.  In addition, the 
opposite situation may be true as the LIWC dictionary may contain words that are classified as 
"Emotional Tone" (i.e. loss) but have a distinct, neutral definition in business or in financial 
results referenced in the comment letters or the company’s response. 
In summary, the empirical findings, through multivariate regression and predictive 
responses, support that top managements’ attitudes and cognitive style, specifically, the degree 
of Clout and Analytical Thinking exhibited by the CEO and CFO, are significant factors that are 
related to financial reporting quality.  Chapter 6 provides a summary of concluding remarks and 
ideas for future research.   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This study examines whether managements’ attitudes and cognitive style, as 
characteristics underlying the philosophy and operating style driving “tone at top” in the control 
environment, are related to an entity’s financial reporting.  Using linguistic markers of CEO and 
CFO attitudes and cognitive style extracted from required responses to financial reporting 
queries from the SEC, I estimate the role of the linguistic markers to concurrent material 
misstatements in the financial statements under scrutiny using three empirical tests.   
First, I examine the role of the four linguistic markers individually and collectively on 
concurrent material misstatements using a multivariate regression.  I find, relative to a sample of 
similar firms without a concurrent material misstatement, higher analytical thinking is associated 
with higher likelihood of a concurrent material misstatement while greater clout (more expertise, 
leadership, and influence) is associated with lower likelihood of a concurrent material 
misstatement.  I find no significant relation between management’s authenticity nor the 
emotional tone on a concurrent material misstatement.   
Second, I consider that the linguistic markers as representative traits of managements’ 
attitudes and cognitive style may not stand alone as individual, unique traits.  Rather, the 
characteristics may be interrelated, occurring in combination with one or more of the other traits.  
To capture the potential holistic interaction of attitudes and cognitive style, I use factor analysis 
to transform the four linguistic markers to a new set of variables, composed of two factors, 
through principal component analysis.  I estimate the effect of the two factors derived from the 
linguistic markers and find the coefficient on a factor composed of negative Analytical Thinking 
and positive Clout is negative and statistically significant, implying that a narrative style from a 
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confident manager decreases the likelihood of a material misstatement, consistent with the 
individual role of managements’ attitudes and cognitive style.   
Third, I consider the role of linguistic markers of managements’ attitudes and cognitive 
style to improve the predictive outcome of the sample to assess whether an entity is materially 
misstated or not misstated. Using the regression equation of the two factors and control variables, 
including company-specific accounting metrics known to effect the likelihood of a material 
misstatement, I find that including factors of linguistic markers improves the accuracy of the 
predicted response by 10%.  The largest improvement was found in the correcting “Type 2” 
errors when the observation was materially misstated (MATMIS = 1) but the observation was 
erroneously classified as not misstated.  There was 25% improvement in Type 2 classification 
error.   
In addition to these empirical findings, I perform bootstrapping, or resampling, to 
understand better the shape of the statistics’ sampling distribution – and, consequently, the effect 
of linguistic markers on concurrent material misstatements.  I bootstrap the sample of 100 
observations for 1,000 iterations to arrive at 1,000 samples, and re-estimate the regression 
equation of the two factors and control variables for empirical testing.  The findings with the 
bootstrapped sample are similar to those inferences with the original sample with an 8% 
improvement in the predictive outcome.   
Overall, my results suggest that top managements’ attitudes and cognitive style in the 
control environment, specifically, the degree of Clout and Analytical Thinking exhibited by the 
CEO and CFO, are significant factors that affect financial reporting quality.  Managements’ clout 
and analytical thinking may influence external reporting, disclosure requirements, and 
accounting judgments directly through tone at the top or indirectly through internal controls.  
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Future work on this topic should include testing the role of managements’ attitude and 
cognitive style to determine if these characteristics are classified as manager fixed-effects.  
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) show individual managers affect corporate behavior and 
performance, such as financial policy, including interest coverage, dividend payouts, and cost-
cutting policies, but do not consider the individual manager traits such as attitudes and cognitive 
style in their analysis.  Identifying if these characteristics are managerial fixed-effects contributes 
would help to identify measurable characteristics that can assist with prediction models and 
identification of risk on an individual manager basis.  If these characteristics are shown to be 
manager fixed-effects, then identifying the traits of management may identify an increase or 
decrease in the risk of material misstatement at a company when the manager changes 
employment. 
Future work might also examine the role of corporate governance and other mechanisms 
in place in order to assess how corporate structures interacts with top managements’ attitudes and 
cognitive style. 
Finally, understanding that management traits of attitudes and cognitive style may 
represent an individual personality trait, it would be valuable to know any specific determinants 
of these traits and whether these characteristic can change through either identification, training, 
or retribution for financial reporting misstatements.  In addition, it is important to consider if 
these changes results in any measurable different operational, financial reporting or economic 
outcomes to the company. 
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Chapter 7: Figures 
Figure 1: Research Design and SEC Review Process Timeline 
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Figure 2: Predictive Validity Analysis 
 
                                               Independent                                                  Dependent  
 
Conceptual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operational  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Control (prior and    
concurrent 
potential causal  
factors) 
 
 
 
Figure 2 diagrams the conceptual and operational relationship for the research question studied 
in this dissertation.  The diagram is based on predictive validity analysis as described in Libby 
(1981).   
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Chapter 8: Tables  
Table 1: Population of Managements’ Response Letters 
Panel A: Count of Population of Managements’ Response Letters to 10-KSBs under SEC Review  
Comment 
Letters
Issuer-Fiscal 
Years
Unique 
Issuers
Responses to SEC Comment Letters on Domestic 10KSB and 10KSB/A filings 1,620 1,641 1,284
Less: 10KSB and 10KSB/A filings by Financial Institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999) -282 -295 -220
Responses to SEC Comment Letters on Domestic Non-Financial 10KSB and 10KSB/A filings 1,338 1,346 1,064
Number of 10KSB and 10KSB/A under SEC Review with Material Misstatement 152 152 126
 
The Securities and Exchange Commission sends comment letters to initiate correspondence and communicate feedback to management of small business issuers 
for the 10-KSB and 10-KSB/A under review.  This table provides a count of management's response to the first, or initial, comment letter sent to the issuer as 
available on EDGAR and accessed through the WRDS SEC Analytics Suite database for a 10-KSB or 10-KSB/A with a fiscal year-end during the three year 
period from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2007.   
 
Panel B: Population of Managements’ Response Letters to 10-KSBs under SEC Review by Year
2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Responses to SEC Comment Letters on Domestic Non-Financial 10KSBs and 10KSB/As filings 452 444 345 97 1,338    
Unique Issuer-Fiscal Years covered in the Responses to Initial SEC Comment Letters 452 449 348 97 1,346    
Unique Issuer-Fiscal Years under SEC Review with Material Misstatement 53 61 32 6 152       
 
This table provides a count of responses to the initial SEC comment letter sent to the issuer by year of the issuer’s fiscal year-end of the 10-KSB or 10-KSB/A 
under review.
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Table 2: Sample Composition of the Response to the Initial SEC Comment 
Letter 
2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Issuer-Fiscal Years covered in the Responses to Initial SEC Comment Letters 452 449 348 97 1346
Less: Issuer-fiscal year t-1 data not available on Compustat -192 -280 -201 -64 -737
Issuer-Fiscal Years with available Compustat data 260 169 147 33 609
Less: Issuer-fiscal year missing at least one required control variable -18 -14 -13 -1 -46
Issuer-Fiscal Years with all required control variables 242 155 134 32 563
Less: Issuer-fiscal year comment letter duplicated in Audit Analytics database -1 -1 0 0 -2
Less: Issuer-fiscal year response below word count threshold (150 words) -1 -2 0 0 -3
Total Issuer-Fiscal Years for Analysis 240 152 134 32 558
2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Issuer-Fiscal Years covered in the Responses to Initial SEC Comment Letters 53 61 32 6 152
Less: Issuer-fiscal year t-1 data not available on Compustat -24 -41 -25 -3 -93
Issuer-Fiscal Years with available Compustat data 29 20 7 3 59
Less: Issuer-fiscal year missing at least one required control variable -1 -2 -1 0 -4
Issuer-Fiscal Years with all required control variables 28 18 6 3 55
Less: Issuer-fiscal year comment letter duplicated in Audit Analytics database -1 -1 0 0 -2
Less: Issuer-fiscal year response below word count threshold (150 words) -1 -2 0 0 -3
Total Issuer-Fiscal Years for Analysis 26 15 6 3 50
2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Issuer-Fiscal Years covered in the Responses to Initial SEC Comment Letters 399 388 316 91 1194
Less: Issuer-fiscal year t-1 data not available on Compustat -168 -239 -176 -61 -644
Issuer-Fiscal Years with available Compustat data 231 149 140 30 550
Less: Issuer-fiscal year missing at least one required control variable -17 -12 -12 -1 -42
Issuer-Fiscal Years with all required control variables 214 137 128 29 508
Less: Issuer-fiscal year comment letter duplicated in Audit Analytics database 0 0 0 0 0
Less: Issuer-fiscal year response below word count threshold (150 words) 0 0 0 0 0
Total Issuer-Fiscal Years for Analysis 214 137 128 29 508
MATERIALLY MISSTATED ISSUERS 
TOTAL ISSUERS
NON-MISSTATED ISSUERS
 
The resulting sample is composed of 558 issuer-fiscal year observations under review by the SEC for fiscal 
year-ends in the three-year period from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2007.  Of this total, 50 issuers had a 
material misstatement (subsequently identified 4.02 GAAP misstatement) and subsequently restated their 
financial statements for the fiscal year under review.   
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on Accounting Variables
Variable Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev. N
MATMIS t 0 0.09 0 0 0.29 558
SIZE t-1 1.21 2.17 2.29 3.18 1.53 558
BM t-1 -0.20 -0.42 0.07 0.36 3.23 558
LEVERAGE t-1 0.29 9.10 0.64 1.95 41.90 558
FIRMAGE t-1 5 11.48 9 17 8.25 558
ROA t-1 -1.48 -4.33 -0.40 -0.01 17.36 558
CAPITAL t-1 0.03 0.22 0.10 0.34 0.27 558
FINANCING t-1 0.00 0.86 0.19 0.88 2.11 558
ACQNOTE t-1 0 0.03 0 0 0.18 558
INTERESTCOV t-1 2 1.65 2 2 0.74 558
LARGEAUDITOR t 0 0.13 0 0 0.33 558
CLFILESIZE t 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04 558
TOTAL ASSETS t-1 0.99 7.83 3.79 10.41 10.52 558
Variable Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev. N Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev. N Mean Median
MATMIS t 0 0 0 0 0 508 1 1 1 1 0 50 1 *** 1 ***
SIZE t-1 1.22 2.20 2.32 3.19 1.49 508 0.89 1.86 1.99 2.98 1.80 50 -0.34 -0.33
BM t-1 -0.19 -0.26 0.07 0.36 2.68 508 -0.83 -2.06 0.01 0.29 6.41 50 -1.80 * -0.06
LEVERAGE t-1 0.29 9.24 0.62 1.95 43.19 508 0.31 7.66 0.79 2.48 25.58 50 -1.59 0.17
FIRMAGE t-1 5 11.69 9 18 8.27 508 4 9.42 7 11 7.83 50 -2.27 * -2.00 **
ROA t-1 -1.40 -4.19 -0.38 -0.01 16.96 508 -2.52 -5.73 -0.44 -0.02 21.16 50 -1.54 -0.06
CAPITAL t-1 0.02 0.22 0.09 0.33 0.27 508 0.04 0.27 0.20 0.43 0.27 50 0.05 0.11
FINANCING t-1 0.00 0.85 0.19 0.83 2.15 508 0.00 0.97 0.18 1.15 1.67 50 0.12 -0.01
ACQNOTE t-1 0 0.04 0 0 0.19 508 0 0.02 0 0 0.14 50 -0.02 0.00
INTERESTCOV t-1 2 1.64 2 2 0.75 508 2 1.74 2 2 0.66 50 0.10 0.00
LARGEAUDITOR t 0 0.13 0 0 0.33 508 0 0.10 0 0 0.30 50 -0.03 0.00
CLFILESIZE t 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04 508 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.05 50 0.00 -0.01
TOTAL ASSETS t-1 1.03 7.84 4.02 10.45 10.20 508 0.93 7.73 2.22 8.42 13.44 50 -0.11 -1.80
Non-Misstated Issuers Materially Misstated Issuers
Full Sample
Difference
a
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Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on accounting variables for the full sample of small business issuers who received an initial comment letter 
from the SEC staff on 10KSBs with fiscal year-ends in the three-year period from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2007.  All variables 
descriptions are included in Appendix C.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
This table also tests for differences in the mean and median between issuers with a material misstatement in the fiscal year under review who 
subsequently restated and issuers who did not have material misstatement.  The difference between mean values were tested using a t-test.  The 
difference between median values were tested using Kruskal-Wallis Tests.  
a  ***, **, and * indicated significant differences between non-misstated and misstated issuers at the 0.01,  0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics on Accounting Variables for the Size- and Industry-Matched Sample 
Variable Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev. N Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev. N Mean Median
MATMIS t 0 0 0 0 0 50 1 1 1 1 0 50 1 *** 1 ***
SIZE t-1 1.16 2.21 2.18 3.12 1.32 50 0.89 1.86 1.99 2.98 1.80 50 -0.36 -0.19
BM t-1 -0.42 -0.50 0.02 0.19 3.31 50 -0.83 -2.06 0.01 0.29 6.41 50 -1.56 -0.01
LEVERAGE t-1 0.37 13.13 0.74 2.76 51.64 50 0.31 7.66 0.79 2.48 25.58 50 -5.47 0.06
FIRMAGE t-1 5 9.16 6 10 7.95 50 4 9.42 7 11 7.83 50 0.26 1.00
ROA t-1 -1.67 -2.52 -0.51 -0.01 7.18 50 -2.52 -5.73 -0.44 -0.02 21.16 50 -3.21 0.07
CAPITAL t-1 0.06 0.29 0.18 0.48 0.29 50 0.04 0.27 0.20 0.43 0.27 50 -0.02 0.02
FINANCING t-1 0.01 0.86 0.26 0.79 2.31 50 0.00 0.97 0.18 1.15 1.67 50 0.11 -0.08
ACQNOTE t-1 0 0.02 0 0 0.14 50 0 0.02 0 0 0.14 50 0.00 0.00
INTERESTCOV t-1 2 1.71 2 2 0.66 50 2 1.74 2 2 0.66 50 0.02 0.00
LARGEAUDITOR t 0 0.06 0 0 0.24 50 0 0.10 0 0 0.30 50 0.04 0.00
CLFILESIZE t 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 50 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.05 50 0.01 0.00
TOTAL ASSETS t-1 0.81 8.47 4.05 11.77 12.17 50 0.93 7.73 2.22 8.42 13.44 50 -0.75 -1.82
Non-Misstated Issuers Materially Misstated Issuers Difference
a
 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics for small business issuers with a material misstatement in the fiscal year under review who subsequently 
restated (N=50) and the size- and industry-matched sample of small business issuers (N=50) who were not misstated.  I match the sample of 
materially misstated filers under SEC review with filers of a similar size and in the same one-digit industry code that received a comment letter but 
who did not restate their annual financial statements due to a 4.02 misstatement.  All variables descriptions are included in Appendix C.  The 
difference between mean values were tested using a t-test.  The difference between median values were tested using Kruskal-Wallis Tests.  
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
a  ***, **, and * indicated significant differences between non-misstated and misstated issuers at the 0.01,  0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix on Size- and Industry-Matched Sample 
Correlation matrix is based the combined sample (N=100) of small business issuers with a material misstatement in the fiscal year under SEC staff 
review who subsequently restated (N=50) and the size- and industry-matched sample of small business issuers (N=50) who were not misstated.  All 
variables are defined in Appendix C.  ***, **, and * indicate significant correlations at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level.  Pearson correlations are recorded 
on the upper diagonal and Spearman correlations are recorded on the lower diagonal.  
Analytical 
Thinking Clout Authenticity
Emotional 
Tone Size BM Leverage Firmage ROA Capital
Analytical Thinking 1 -0.42 *** -0.34 *** 0.16 0.0319 -0.07 0.06 -0.09 -0.08 0.01
Clout -0.34 *** 1 0.10 -0.15 0.0843 0.12 0.08 -0.10 0.02 0.12
Authenticity -0.39 *** 0.11 1 -0.20 ** 0.1335 0.09 -0.18 * 0.17 * 0.13 -0.08
Emotional Tone 0.21 ** -0.13 -0.20 ** 1 0.0495 -0.06 0.18 * -0.18 * -0.09 0.03
Size 0.06 0.13 0.11 -0.02 1 0.48 *** -0.21 ** -0.09 0.15 0.00
BM -0.04 -0.02 0.10 -0.18 * 0.41 *** 1 -0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.13
Leverage 0.03 0.06 -0.15 0.14 -0.53 *** -0.84 *** 1 -0.10 -0.48 *** -0.01
Firmage -0.13 -0.18 * 0.24 ** -0.10 -0.18 * 0.01 -0.02 1 0.15 0.00
ROA -0.13 -0.08 0.20 ** -0.18 * 0.09 0.48 *** -0.41 *** 0.36 1 0.01
Capital 0.02 0.13 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.02 1
Financing 0.18 * 0.14 -0.13 0.29 *** 0.16 -0.22 ** 0.11 -0.29 *** -0.44 *** 0.05
AcqNote 0.12 -0.02 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.20 ** -0.15 0.02 0.12 -0.05
InterestCov 0.02 0.06 -0.08 0.01 0.14 -0.31 *** 0.17 * -0.22 ** -0.57 *** 0.01
LargeAuditor 0.04 0.00 0.11 -0.08 0.16 0.15 -0.11 0.09 0.01 -0.05
CLFileSize 0.13 -0.03 -0.15 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.01
Total Assets -0.01 -0.03 0.23 ** -0.10 0.54 *** 0.62 *** -0.64 *** 0.19 * 0.55 *** 0.10
WordCountMgt 0.14 -0.35 *** -0.10 0.18 * 0.10 0.04 -0.10 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
WordCountSEC 0.03 -0.15 -0.22 ** 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix on Size- and Industry-Matched Sample (continued)
 
Financing AcqNote
Interest 
Cov
Large 
Auditor CLFile Size
Total 
Assets
WordCount
Mgt
WordCount
SEC
Analytical Thinking 0.09 0.09 -0.05 -0.03 0.19 * 0.05 0.17 * 0.09
Clout 0.07 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.30 *** -0.16
Authenticity -0.20 ** 0.10 -0.12 0.10 -0.16 0.08 -0.18 * -0.27 ***
Emotional Tone 0.28 *** 0.01 0.02 -0.07 0.00 -0.11 0.25 ** 0.15
Size -0.06 0.03 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.45 *** 0.19 * -0.05
BM -0.02 0.07 -0.16 0.08 -0.01 0.21 ** -0.11 -0.11
Leverage 0.65 *** -0.04 -0.12 -0.05 0.06 -0.15 -0.03 0.10
Firmage -0.19 * 0.14 -0.29 *** 0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.11
ROA -0.07 0.04 -0.12 0.04 -0.08 0.16 0.05 0.07
Capital -0.07 -0.09 0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.14 0.04 -0.08
Financing 1 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 -0.18 * 0.01 0.16
AcqNote 0.01 1 0.06 0.22 ** -0.10 0.12 0.02 0.00
InterestCov 0.20 ** 0.06 1 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.14 0.03
LargeAuditor 0.10 0.22 ** 0.03 1 0.02 0.31 *** 0.07 -0.05
CLFileSize -0.03 -0.07 0.14 -0.03 1 0.12 0.19 * 0.29 ***
Total Assets -0.23 ** 0.19 * -0.04 0.18 * 0.11 1 0.08 -0.04
WordCountMgt 0.05 0.08 0.21 ** 0.08 0.38 *** 0.12 1 0.57 ***
WordCountSEC -0.03 0.05 0.13 -0.09 0.44 *** -0.06 0.62 *** 1
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics on Linguistics Markers for the Size- and Industry-Matched Sample 
This table provides univariate results for the small business issuers with a material misstatement in the fiscal year under review who subsequently 
restated (N=50) and the size- and industry-matched sample of small business issuers (N=50) who were not misstated.  All variables descriptions 
are included in Appendix C.  The difference between mean values were tested using a t-test.  The difference between median values were tested 
using Kruskal-Wallis Tests.  Variables are not winsorized.  
a  ***, **, and * indicated significant differences between non-misstated and misstated issuers at the 0.01,  0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev. N Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev. N Mean Median
MATMIS t 0 0 0 0 0 50 1 1 1 1 0 50 1 *** 1 ***
Analytical Thinking 96.02 96.60 97.82 98.42 3.16 50 97.56 97.80 98.38 98.96 1.53 50 1.20 ** 0.56 **
Clout 63.11 74.90 75.06 86.69 12.92 50 63.63 69.35 67.72 76.31 8.89 50 -5.55 ** -7.34 **
Authenticity 15.13 25.12 20.95 35.75 13.56 50 14.32 21.78 20.83 25.33 9.66 50 -3.33 -0.12
Emotional Tone 49.64 61.34 60.77 75.00 15.83 50 50.53 63.80 64.48 78.83 18.62 50 2.46 3.71
WordCountMgt 524     1,875    1,230    2,568       1,894 50 742    2,181    1,305    3,334       2,112 50 306 75
WordCountSEC 865     1,567    1,182    1,752       1,050 50 815    1,403    1,041    1,666          982 50 -164 -141
Non-Misstated Issuers Materially Misstated Difference
a
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Table 7: The Effect of Managements’ Attitudes and Cognitive Style on Financial Reporting Quality 
 
This table shows multivariate regression results for results for the small business issuers with a material misstatement in the fiscal year under 
review who subsequently restated (N=50) and the size- and industry-matched sample of small business issuers (N=50) who were not misstated for 
Equation (1):  
(1) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝜃 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀 
 
where LinguisticMarkers are Analytical Thinking, Clout, Authenticity, and Emotional Tone.  All variables are defined in Appendix C.  
Column 1
a
Column 2
a
Column 3
a
Column 4
a
Column 5
a
Column 6
a
Dependent Variable MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS
Intercept 0.09 -24.07 ** 3.09 * 0.71 -0.65 -13.15
Analytical Thinking 0.25 ** 0.15
Clout -0.04 ** -0.03
Authenticity -0.02 -0.01
Emotional Tone 0.01 0.00
Size -0.17 -0.19 -0.15 -0.16 -0.19 -0.17
FIRMAGE 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02
ROA -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Capital -0.33 -0.49 -0.10 -0.41 -0.36 -0.31
Financing 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
AcqNote -0.28 -0.94 -0.24 -0.21 -0.38 -0.67
InterestCov 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.12
LargeAuditor 0.67 0.82 0.63 0.76 0.73 0.77
CLFileSize 6.37 3.22 6.10 4.93 6.04 3.53
Fixed effects
b Year Year Year Year Year Year
McFadden's R
2 0.052 0.092 0.089 0.062 0.058 0.107
Likelihood-based Pseudo R
2 0.070 0.119 0.116 0.083 0.078 0.137
N 100 100 100 100 100 100  
a  ***, **, and * indicated significant differences between non-misstated and misstated issuers at the 0.01,  0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
b Results are similar with year and single-digit industry fixed-effects. 
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Table 8: Results of Factor Analysis 
Based on a review of the correlation matrix and the findings in Table 7, some of the linguistic markers are 
correlated, which may indicate components of managements’ attitudes and cognitive may be composed of 
a combination of one or more linguistic markers.  Thus, I employ factor analysis using principal 
component analysis.  In this case, a “factor” is a set of observed variables that have similar response 
patterns because they are associated with a variable that is not directly measured. 
Using SAS, I employ principal component analysis.  The following chart is extracted from SAS and 
represents the Rotated Factor Pattern after a VARIMAX rotation, applied for ease of interpretation:  
 
Factor 1 Factor 2
Analytical Thinking -0.77562 0.31066
Clout 0.87821 0.02761
Authenticity 0.18225 -0.75449
Emotional Tone -0.03000 0.75951
Rotated Factor Pattern 
 
 
As only values in excess of 0.50 or less than -0.50 indicated the markers affect the factor, there are two 
main factors.  
Factor 1:  Factor 1 is composed of negative Analytical Thinking and (positive) Clout.  A lower level of 
Analytical Thinking is composed of a personal, narrative style of writing with low cognitive complexity.  
Greater Clout is associated with more status, power or expertise.  Consequently, the factor captures a 
narrative, personal style with the manager reflecting confidence and expertise. 
Factor 2: Factor 2 is composed of negative Authenticity, higher indication of deception.  Higher 
Emotional Tone is associated with a positive, upbeat style.  This factor indicates management is being 
deceptive but the language is positive in nature. 
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Table 9: Regression Equation for Factor Analysis 
 
This table shows multivariate regression results for results for the small business issuers with a material 
misstatement in the fiscal year under review who subsequently restated (N=50) and the size- and industry-
matched sample of small business issuers (N=50) who were not misstated for Equation (2):  
 
(2) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀 
 
where Factors are Factor1, a confident, narrative personal style, and Factor 2, a resistant, withholding yet 
positive style.  All other variables are defined in Appendix C.  
 
Column 1
a
Column 2
a
Column 3
a
Column 4
a
Dependent Variable MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS
Intercept 0.09 -0.05 0.15 0.02
Factor1 -0.59 ** -0.59 **
Factor2 0.25 0.25
Size -0.17 -0.15 -0.18 -0.16
FIRMAGE 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
ROA -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Capital -0.33 -0.19 -0.42 -0.28
Financing 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.02
AcqNote -0.28 -0.55 -0.35 -0.60
InterestCov 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.11
LargeAuditor 0.67 0.70 0.78 0.76
CLFileSize 6.37 4.82 5.18 3.60
Fixed effects
b Year Year Year Year
McFadden's R
2 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.11
Likelihood-based Pseudo R
2 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.14
N 100 100 100 100
  
a  ***, **, and * indicated significant differences between non-misstated and misstated issuers at the 0.01,  
0.05, and 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
b Results are similar with year and single-digit industry fixed-effects. 
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Table 10: Predicted Response Analysis for Regression with Factors 
Panel A: Accuracy of Predicted Response for Controls-Only Equation 
The chart below counts predicted values for the equation as estimated in Column 1 of Table 9: 
 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀  
MATMIS = 0 MATMIS = 1 Total
Predicted = 0 31 20 51
Type 2 Error
Predicted = 1 19 30 49
Type 1 Error
50 50 100
Type 1 Classification Error 38%
Type 2 Classification Error 40%
Total accurate prediction 61%
 
Panel B: Accuracy of Predicted Response for Multivariate Equation with Factors 
The chart below counts predicted values for Equation (2) as estimated in Column 4 of Table 9: 
(2) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀 
MATMIS = 0 MATMIS = 1 Total
Predicted = 0 32 15 47
Type 2 Error
Predicted = 1 18 35 53
Type 1 Error
50 50 100
Type 1 Classification Error 36%
Type 2 Classification Error 30%
Total accurate prediction 67%
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Panel C: Increased Accuracy of Multivariate Equation  
From Table 10, Panel A: Controls-Only Equation 
Type 1 Classification Error 38%
Type 2 Classification Error 40%
Total accurate prediction 61%
From Table 10, Panel B: Multivariate Regression using Factors
Type 1 Classification Error 36%
Type 2 Classification Error 30%
Total accurate prediction 67%
Percent reduction in Type 1 Error -5% reduction in error
Percent reduction in Type 2 Error -25% reduction in error
Percent of increase in accuracy prediction 10% improvement 
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Table 11: Bootstrapping Results for Factor Analysis Regression 
Using the complete sample of size- and industry-matched data (N=100), I bootstrapped this sample using a simple random sampling 
with replacement to create 1,000 samples composed of 100 observations.  Using these 1,000 samples, I re-estimated Equation (2) 
1,000 times:   
(2) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀  
The following data provides descriptive statistics of the distribution for the intercept and the estimated coefficients on Factor1, 
Factor2, and each control variable and a count of the number of observations that fall into the 1%, 5%, and 10% level:
Estimate of: Q1 Mean Median Q3 Std. Dev. N 1% level 5% level 10% level
Excess of 
10% level N
a0 Intercept -0.52 0.23 0.24 0.97 1.37         1,000 9 49 114 886     1,000 
Coefficient on:
g1 Factor1 -0.87 -0.66 -0.63 -0.43 0.36         1,000 318 598 721 279     1,000 
g2 Factor2 0.02 0.27 0.27 0.50 0.38         1,000 56 157 259 741     1,000 
b1 Size -0.34 -0.22 -0.22 -0.10 0.21         1,000 75 235 356 644     1,000 
b2 FIRMAGE -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05         1,000 25 114 209 791     1,000 
b3 ROA -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.08         1,000 2 30 84 916     1,000 
b4 Capital -1.22 -0.55 -0.48 0.18 1.17         1,000 32 105 180 820     1,000 
b5 Financing -0.09 0.12 0.00 0.25 0.36         1,000 26 93 168 832     1,000 
b6 AcqNote -2.68 -0.66 -0.41 0.55 8.75         1,000 0 0 0 1,000     1,000 
b7 InterestCov -0.27 0.06 0.02 0.37 0.60         1,000 14 68 117 883     1,000 
b8 LargeAuditor 0.03 1.49 0.84 1.69 4.07         1,000 10 72 159 841     1,000 
b9 CLFileSize 0.09 5.73 5.54 10.45 8.81         1,000 17 78 148 852     1,000 
b10 Year2005 -0.92 -0.42 -0.40 0.08 0.77         1,000 24 109 181 819     1,000 
b11 Year2006 -2.03 -1.50 -1.33 -0.69 1.62         1,000 88 279 406 594     1,000 
b12 Year2007 -0.93 1.27 0.16 1.58 5.85         1,000 10 47 106 894     1,000 
No. of observations at Statistically Significant levels:
I use values of the mean estimate coefficients to estimate a coefficient as the basis for the predictive analysis described in Section 5.5 
and documented in Table 12. 
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Table 12: Predicted Response Analysis for Regression with Bootstrapped 
Sample 
Panel A: Accuracy of Predicted Response for Controls-Only Equation 
The chart below counts predicted values for the equation as estimated in Column 1 of Table 9: 
 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀  
MATMIS = 0 MATMIS = 1 Total
Predicted = 0 31 20 51
Type 2 Error
Predicted = 1 19 30 49
Type 1 Error
50 50 100
Type 1 Classification Error 38%
Type 2 Classification Error 40%
Total accurate prediction 61%
 
Panel B: Accuracy of Predicted Response for Bootstrapped Sample 
The chart below counts predicted values for Equation (2) using the mean coefficients from a 
1,000 bootstrapped samples as shown in Table 11: 
(2) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀 
MATMIS = 0 MATMIS = 1 Total
Predicted = 0 38 22 60
Type 2 Error
Predicted = 1 12 28 40
Type 1 Error
50 50 100
Type 1 Classification Error 24%
Type 2 Classification Error 44%
Total accurate prediction 66%  
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Panel C: Increased Accuracy of Multivariate Equation 
From Table 12, Panel A: Controls-Only Equation 
Type 1 Classification Error 38%
Type 2 Classification Error 40%
Total accurate prediction 61%
From Table 12, Panel B: Bootstrapped Multivariate Regression using Factors
Type 1 Classification Error 24%
Type 2 Classification Error 44%
Total accurate prediction 66%
Percent reduction in Type 1 Error -37% reduction in error
Percent increase in Type 2 Error 10% increase in error
Percent of increase in accuracy prediction 8% improvement 
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Table 13: Regression Equation: Response Letter Word Count Exceeds 500 Words 
 
To ensure the text analyzed in the sample was of sufficient volume, the sample was limited to response letters that exceed 500 words. This table 
shows multivariate regression results for results for the small business issuers with a material misstatement in the fiscal year under review who 
subsequently restated (N=38) and the size- and industry-matched sample of small business issuers (N=38) who were not misstated for Equation 
(1):  
(1) 𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑀𝐼𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼0,𝑡 + 𝜃 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡−1 +  𝜀 
 
where LinguisticMarkers are Analytical Thinking, Clout, Authenticity, and Emotional Tone.  All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Column 1
a
Column 2
a
Column 3
a
Column 4
a
Column 5
a
Column 6
a
Dependent Variable MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS MATMIS
Intercept -0.56 -22.05 * 1.20 0.18 -0.98 -16.41
Analytical Thinking 0.22 * 0.17
Clout -0.03 0.00
Authenticity -0.04 -0.02
Emotional Tone 0.01 0.00
Size -0.18 -0.20 -0.18 -0.16 -0.20 -0.18
FIRMAGE 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
ROA -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
Capital 1.10 0.78 1.06 1.10 1.08 0.85
Financing -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
AcqNote -0.07 -0.70 -0.04 0.06 -0.13 -0.48
InterestCov 0.00 0.10 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.07
LargeAuditor 0.81 0.92 0.84 1.00 0.86 0.98
CLFileSize 6.63 4.28 6.90 5.08 6.05 4.07
Fixed effects
b Year Year Year Year Year Year
McFadden's R
2
0.08 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.11
Likelihood-based Pseudo R
2
0.11 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.15
N 76 76 76 76 76 76  
a  * indicated significant differences between non-misstated and misstated issuers at the 0.10 level (two-tailed). 
b Results are similar with year and single-digit industry fixed-effects. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A:  LIWC2015 Output Variable Information from Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, 
and Blackburn (2015)
Category Abbrev Examples
Words in 
Category
Word Count WC
Summary Language Variables 
Analytical thinking Analytical
Clout Clout
Authentic Authentic
Emotional tone Tone
Words per sentence WPS
Words > 6 letters Sixltr
Dictionary words Dic
Linguistic Dimensions
Total function words funct it, to, no, very 491
Total pronouns pronoun I, them, itself 153
Personal pronouns ppron I, them, her 93
1st pers singular i I, me, mine 24
1st pers plural we we, us, our 12
2nd person you you, your, thou 30
3rd pers singular shehe she, her, him 17
3rd pers plural they they, their, they’d 11
Impersonal pronouns ipron it, it’s, those 59
Articles article a, an, the 3
Prepositions prep to, with, above 74
Auxiliary verbs auxverb am, will, have 141
Common Adverbs adverb very, really  140
Conjunctions conj and, but, whereas 43
Negations negate no, not, never 62
Other Grammar
Common verbs verb eat, come, carry 1000
Common adjectives adj free, happy, long 764
Comparisons compare greater, best, after 317
Interrogatives interrog how, when, what 48
Numbers number second, thousand 36
Quantifiers quant few, many, much 77
Psychological Processes
Affective processes affect happy, cried  1393
Positive emotion posemo love, nice, sweet 620
Negative emotion negemo hurt, ugly, nasty 744
Anxiety anx worried, fearful 116
Anger anger hate, kill, annoyed 230
Sadness sad crying, grief, sad 136  
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Appendix A: LIWC2015 Output Variable Information from Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, 
and Blackburn (2015) (continued) 
Category Abbrev Examples
Words in 
Category
Social processes social mate, talk, they 756
Family family daughter, dad, aunt 118
Friends friend buddy, neighbor 95
Female references female girl, her, mom 124
Male references male boy, his, dad 116
Cognitive processes cogproc cause, know, ought 797
Insight insight think, know 259
Causation cause because, effect 135
Discrepancy discrep should, would 83
Tentative tentat maybe, perhaps 178
Certainty certain always, never 113
Differentiation differ hasn’t, but, else 81
Perceptual processes percept look, heard, feeling 436
See see view, saw, seen 126
Hear hear listen, hearing 93
Feel feel feels, touch 128
Biological processes bio eat, blood, pain 748
Body body cheek, hands, spit 215
Health health clinic, flu, pill 294
Sexual sexual horny, love, incest 131
Ingestion ingest dish, eat, pizza 184
Drives drives 1103
Affiliation affiliation ally, friend, social 248
Achievement achieve win, success, better 213
Power power superior, bully 518
Reward reward take, prize, benefit 120
Risk risk danger, doubt 103
Time orientations TimeOrient
Past focus focuspast ago, did, talked 341
Present focus focuspresent today, is, now 424
Future focus focusfuture may, will, soon 97
Relativity relativ area, bend, exit 974
Motion motion arrive, car, go 325
Space space down, in, thin 360
Time time end, until, season 310
Personal concerns
Work work job, majors, xerox 444
Leisure leisure cook, chat, movie 296
Home home kitchen, landlord 100
Money money audit, cash, owe 226
Religion relig altar, church 174
Death death bury, coffin, kill 74   
95 
 
 
Appendix A:  LIWC2015 Output Variable Information from Pennebaker, Boyd, Jordan, 
and Blackburn (2015) (continued) 
Category Abbrev Examples
Words in 
Category
Informal language informal 380
Swear swear fuck, damn, shit 131
Netspeak netspeak btw, lol, thx 209
Assent assent agree, OK, yes 36
Nonfluencies nonflu er, hm, umm 19
Fillers filler Imean, youknow 14
 
Notes for Appendix A: “Words in category” refers to the number of different dictionary words 
and stems that make up the variable category. Note that the LIWC2015 dictionary generally 
arranges categories hierarchically. There are some exceptions to the hierarchy rules. For 
example, Social processes include a large group of words that denote social processes, including 
all non-first-person singular personal pronouns as well as verbs that suggest human interaction 
(talking, sharing) many of these words do not belong to any of the Social processes 
subcategories. Another example is Relativity, which includes a large number of words that 
cannot be found in any of its subcategories. 
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Appendix B: Example Calculations of Linguistic Marker Variables 
The following excerpt was taken from a response to a comment letter written for an issuer that 
did not have a material misstatement in the fiscal year under review (a “non-misstated issuer”).  
Each comment letter was cleaned to remove administrative information about the company and 
to remove any text written by the SEC, including the original SEC comment. For example, in the 
illustration below, the text processed through the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (“LIWC”) 
software is italicized.  
July 13, 2005 
VIA FACSIMILE AND U.S. MAIL 
Ivette Leon 
Division of Corporation Finance 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Station Place 
100 F. Street, N.E. 
Washington, D.C. 20549 
 
Re: 
CIRCUIT RESEARCH LABS, INC. 
Form 10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2004 
Form 10-QSB for fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2005 
File No. 0-11353 
Dear Ms. Leon: 
Circuit Research Labs, an Arizona corporation (the “Company” or “we” in the responses below), 
is in receipt of the Staff’s letter dated June 7, 2005 (the “Letter”), regarding the Staff’s review 
of, and comment on, the Company’s Form10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2004 and 
Form 10-Q for fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2005.  For convenience, we have reproduced the 
Staff’s comments in full below, and each comment is followed by the Company’s 
response.  This letter is being faxed to you and will be filed on EDGAR tagged as 
correspondence.   
Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2004 
Note 1.  Significant Accounting Policies 
Goodwill 
1. 
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We note that you concluded that the estimated fair value of your company was in excess of its 
carrying value at December 31, 2004 and 2003 and therefore you have determined that there 
was no goodwill impairment as of those dates.  We also note your disclosure in the Form 8-K 
filed on April 15, 2005 that you were evaluating and have not yet concluded if you need to 
impair goodwill.  In this regard, describe for us the reporting unit or units you used in 
performing the annual goodwill impairment test.  Tell us how you applied the guidance in 
paragraphs 30 through 36 of SFAS 142 in determining your reporting units. 
Company Response: We do not consider various operations to be separate reporting units 
under the criteria set forth in FAS 142.  We believe that our Orban, Orban Europe and CRL 
operations meet the criteria to be a single reporting unit.  We feel that there are similar 
economic characteristics among the operations because the product and services, production 
process, customers and distribution channels are substantially similar.  In addition, the 
operations are managed by the same executive team and there are no executive management 
personnel at the operational level.  Further, the operations do not produce or prepare separate 
reports on the Company’s divisions for purposes of internal analysis, nor does management 
conduct a disaggregated evaluation of the Company’s operations.  Rather, the executive team 
receives reports containing overall performance data on a product by product basis, not on the 
basis of separate operations.  It should be further noted that the CRL and Orban Europe 
operations separately account for less than 10% of the Company’s operations.  While the 
operations are operated at different locations, the operations are treated as single integrated 
business.  Based on the above, we treat our entire operations as one reporting segment and 
one reporting unit.  Thus, we believe we satisfy the FAS 142 requirement that goodwill be 
tested for impairment at the reporting unit level.   
When the Form 8-K was filed on April 15, 2005, it was unclear whether the Harman transaction 
would be recorded in the period ending December 31, 2004.  Had the transaction been 
recorded in the period ending 2004 the goodwill impairment analysis might have been 
reevaluated.  In fact the Harman transaction was not recorded in the period ending December 
31, 2004.  Therefore, the Company feels that the information contained in the Form 10-K and 
Form 10-Q was accurate when those documents were filed. 
 
Using LIWC, I analyzed this excerpt and identified there were 396 words.  The LIWC dictionary 
classified 78%, or 309 words, from the text.  All words in the LIWC dictionary are bolded for 
identification.  
Analytical Thinking  
The degree of analytical thinking is 93.54 (out of 100) and is supported by the fact that 12% of 
the words in the text, or approximately 48 words, are associated with cognitive processing.  
These words include or, nor, response, not, consider, separate, believe, feels, because, produce, 
analysis, evaluation, rather, overall, basis, should, different and based.  In addition, another 10% 
of the words in the text are articles (a, an, the) indicating a precise, formal description of events 
and a high degree of analytical thinking.   
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Clout  
The degree of clout from the text is 64.77 (out of 100).  Approximately 2.5% of the words in the 
text are first-person plural (we, our), which indicates higher clout.  However, the author does not 
use any first-person singular pronouns (I) nor does she refer to refer to the other person through 
second-person singular pronouns (you) more than once.  These findings lower the measure of 
clout. 
  
Authenticity  
The authenticity measure from the text is 48.05 (out of 100).  This measure is supported by the 
author’s use of 3.8%, or 15 words, composed of differentiation, including or, nor, not, separate, 
and rather.  Differentiation words are one category of cognitive processing words that 
collectively compose 12% of the text.  However, authentic authors tend to use first-person 
singular pronouns (I, me, my) but there is no use of these words in the response letter.  
Consequently, the authenticity measure falls below 50.  
 
Emotional Tone 
The degree of emotional tone is classified as 39.3 (out of 100).  There were no negative emotion 
words included in the text and only three positive emotion words – Dear, treat, and satisfy – 
composing less than 1% of the words in the text.  This breakdown of negative and positive 
emotion supports a lack of emotional tone and value close to the middle range (~50) indicating 
ambivalence. 
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Appendix C: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
ACQNOTEi,t-1    Indicator variable equal to "1" when an acquisition for company i in year 
t-1 accounts for 20% or more of total sales, and "0" otherwise.    
 
ANALYTICAL  A summary variable extracted from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word  
THINKINGi Count (“LIWC”) software program that measures the degree of analytical 
thinking composed of heightened abstract thinking and cognitive 
complexity, in spoken or written text out of standardized score of 100, 
obtained from the response letter written by management of company i. 
 
AUTHENTICITYi  A summary variable extracted from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (“LIWC”) software program that measures authenticity, or truth-
telling, in spoken or written text out of standardized score of 100, obtained 
from the response letter written by management of company i. 
 
BMi,t-1   Ratio of the book value of equity (CEQ) from Compustat to market value 
of equity for company i, at the end of year t-1.     
    
CAPITALi,t-1     Net plant, property, and equipment (PPENT) from Compustat scaled by 
total assets (AT) for company i, at the end of year t-1.    
             
CLFILESIZEi,t Digital size of the text of the initial, or first, comment letter sent from the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to the management of company i for 
fiscal-year t which prompted management’s reply, measured in 
megabytes. 
 
CLOUTi A summary variable extracted from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (“LIWC”) software program that measures clout, or leadership, 
dominance or status position, in spoken or written text out of standardized 
score of 100, obtained from the response letter written by management of 
company i. 
 
EMOTIONAL TONEi  A summary variable extracted from the Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (“LIWC”) software program that measures the extent of positive, 
upbeat emotion (anxiety, sadness, or hostility) through positive (negative) 
emotion in spoken or written text out of standardized score of 100, 
obtained from the response letter written by management of company i.  A 
number around 50 suggests either a lack of emotionality or a level of 
ambivalence. 
 
FINANCINGi,t-1      Sum of amount raised from stock and debt issuances during the year 
scaled by total assets (AT) for company i, at the end of year t-1.   
           
 
100 
 
FIRMAGEi,t-1     Number of years company i appears on Compustat through year t-1. 
        
INDUSi,k  Indicator variable equal to "1" if company i is in industry k in year t, based 
on three-digit SIC codes, and "0" otherwise.     
 
INTERESTCOVi,t-1    Ratio of interest expense (XINT) to net income (IB) for company i, at the 
end of year t-1.  If net income for the year t-1 is negative or interest 
expense is more than twice net income, INTERESTCOV is set to 2.  
 
LARGEAUDITORi,t Categorial variable equal to "1" if company i is audited by a firm in year t 
subject to an annual inspection review by the PCAOB, which includes 
firms PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, Deloitte & 
Touche LLP, KPMG LLP, Grant Thornton LLP, BDO Seidman LLP, 
McGladrey & Pullen LLP, and Crowe Chizek and Company LLC;  and 
"0" otherwise.         
     
LEVERAGEi,t-1    Total liabilities (LT) from Compustat divided by total assets (AT), at the 
end of year t-1.  
     
MATMISi,t   Indicator variable equal to "1" if company i declared a 4.02 GAAP 
restatement on 10-KSB for fiscal-year t, where a SEC comment letter was 
received for year t, and "0" otherwise. 
 
ROAi,t-1    Income before extraordinary items (IB) from Computat divided by total 
assets (AT) for company i, at the end of year t-1.      
             
SIZEi,t-1   Natural logarithm of market value in millions calculated as Compustat 
variables fiscal year price close, PRCC_F, times common shares 
outstanding, CSHO, for company i, at the end of year t-1.  
 
TOTAL ASSETS  Total assets (AT) from Compustat, in millions, at the end of year t-1.     
        
WORDCOUNTMGTi Count of the number of words in the response letter written by 
management of company i. to the SEC 
 
WORDCOUNTSECi Count of the number of words in the first letter from the SEC staff to 
management of company i. 
             
YEARi,t    Indicator variable equal to "1" if company i is in year t, and "0" otherwise  
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